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

The South Asian Military Handbook

Secret
August 1974

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NOTE

This publication was prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

It is anticipated that the Handbook will be updated, when necessary, by issuing only relevant sections rather than re-issuing the entire publication. For this reason, the Handbook has been punched for insertion in a three-ring binder.

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I. BACKGROUND 1947-1974

A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary

Partition and Kashmir

In August 1947, following years of agitation by the predominantly Hindu Congress Party, Great Britain gave up its Indian Empire. At the same time, as a result of Muslim agitation, Britain partitioned India, creating Pakistan from the two largest predominantly Muslim areas.

The two wings of Pakistan had little in common other than religion and were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Even before partition became official, millions of Hindus had moved from Pakistan to India, and millions of Muslims had migrated in the opposite direction. Violence on both sides encouraged the exodus. Nevertheless, some 10 percent of India's population remained Muslim, and several million Hindus stayed in Pakistan—almost all in East Pakistan.

Large parts of the British Indian Empire had been ruled by theoretically sovereign native princes. The British left to them the decision as to whether their states would join Pakistan or India, or remain independent. In instances where the religion of the prince and his subjects was the same, accession did not become a problem in Indo-Pakistani relations. A few Muslim princes ruled predominantly Hindu populations in states not contiguous to Pakistan. Although several of these princes either acceded to Pakistan or decided to remain independent, all of their states were eventually incorporated into India.

In Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu Maharajah ruled a population that was mostly Muslim. When he delayed making a decision, some of his Muslim subjects rebelled, receiving assistance from some Pakistani tribesmen. At this point—on October 27—the Maharajah opted for India in return for Indian military assistance. Indian troops arrived in the state the same day. The Indians and the Pakistanis fought in Kashmir for over a year, and in the end India held most of the state, including the strategically important Vale.

Pakistan annexed part of northern Kashmir and gained control of a small part of western Kashmir, the theoretically independent state of Azad Kashmir. The UN Security Council called for a plebiscite to determine the future status of Kashmir, but the plebiscite was never held. A cease-fire line was delineated in the summer of 1949, under UN auspices, and served as the de facto boundary until 1971.

Kutch and Kashmir

For over 15 years, despite continuing hostility, open fighting between India and Pakistan was limited to border incidents. In the spring of 1965, however, serious clashes broke out in a desolate area along the shore of the Arabian Sea known as the Rann of Kutch, where India and Pakistan had conflicting claims. Both sides eventually agreed to arbitration, and in 1968 a decision was announced that was generally regarded as favorable to Pakistan.

In August 1965, Pakistan began sending "freedom fighters" into Indian-held Kashmir. India moved quickly to seal off the access routes, making incursions into Azad Kashmir in the process. In any case, no enthusiasm for rebellion developed among the Kashmiris. On September 1, Pakistan launched an attack against extreme southern Kashmir in hopes of cutting India's communications with its forces farther north in the state. Five days later, India began a full-scale attack in the Lahore area of West Pakistan. The Pakistanis held the Indians outside of Lahore, and with little or no resistance captured extensive desert area in Rajasthan, but were unable to advance farther into Kashmir. By mutual agreement there was virtually no fighting along the border between India and East Pakistan. After three weeks of fighting in the West, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire. The Pakistanis were running critically short of military supplies, while the Indians believed that their gains would not be worth the considerable cost of protracting the war. Under Soviet sponsorship, the two countries reached an agreement in January 1966 at Tashkent that restored the border to that existing before the war.

Bangladesh and Kashmir

In Pakistan's general elections in December 1970, the Awami League, which advocated provincial autonomy, won enough seats in East Pakistan to ensure an absolute majority in the projected Pakistan National Assembly. The assembly was to write a new constitution, and the leaders of the league refused to compromise on principles many West Pakistanis felt would eventually dissolve the union. In early March 1971, the Awami League in effect took over the administration of the province, and on March 25, the army moved to restore central authority. The Bengalees then proclaimed their independence.

The Indian Government felt threatened by events in East Pakistan. About 10 million Bengalees eventually fled to India, creating major economic problems and potentially serious political and social ones.

Inside East Pakistan, extreme leftists became stronger, although they never became more than a long-term potential threat to the moderates in the freedom movement.

India supported the Bengali guerrillas, hoping to force Islamabad to grant the Bengalees' political demands. By fall, the Indians were clearly willing to risk war, and by late November regular Indian forces, in brigade strength, were conducting raids into East Pakistan.

On December 3, Pakistan launched air strikes at air bases in western India, and full-scale war on two fronts began. In the East, on December 4, India invaded East Pakistan. Pakistani forces surrendered after two weeks of fighting, and Bangladesh became independent. In the West, the main Pakistani attack into Kashmir stalled, but both sides seized some territory along the cease-fire line. In the strategic Lahore sector, there was relatively little fighting, but in the Sind, the Indians seized over 5,000 square miles of territory. The Indians proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire along the western border effective as of December 17, and the Pakistanis concurred.

In July 1972, at Simla, the two sides agreed to withdraw their troops from occupied territory, except in Kashmir, where a new "line of control" was established. The agreement was implemented in December.

In August 1973, India and Pakistan, with the concurrence of Bangladesh, agreed to a three-way repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war from India, Bengalees from Pakistan to Bangladesh, and Pakistanis and some non-Bengalee Muslims from Bangladesh to Pakistan. By February 1974, Pakistan was willing to extend official recognition to Bangladesh and, at a tripartite meeting in New Delhi in April, Bangladesh gave up all plans for holding war crimes trials for some of the Pakistani prisoners of war. The repatriation of the POWs was completed by May 1.

A new factor in Indo-Pakistani relations emerged with the explosion of a nuclear device by India on May 18, 1974. New Delhi's public assurances that the test was only for peaceful purposes did little to calm the strongly negative reaction in Pakistan. Moves toward normalization of relations between the two governments were expected to be more difficult in the aftermath of the nuclear explosion because the government of Pakistan could not afford to appear to be negotiating new agreements with India under the threat of nuclear blackmail.

B. Pushtunistan

Pushtunistan is an Afghan term that generally refers to the two eastern provinces of Pakistan: Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier. Sparsely

populated by tribesmen speaking Pushtu, Baluchi, or Brahui, the two provinces comprise more than half of the land area of Pakistan and have an extended Arabian Sea coastline.

The Pushtu-speaking tribesmen were separated from their fellow tribes in Afghanistan in 1893 when a British-Afghan agreement established the Durand Line as the international boundary between British India and Afghanistan. This boundary was confirmed in a treaty between the two countries in 1919.

When Pakistan became independent in 1947, Afghanistan stated that it considered the 1893 treaty invalid because it had been signed under duress, and further asserted that it did not recognize the line as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Continuing at varying levels over the years, the dispute reached its peak in 1960 and 1961 with border clashes, restrictions on the seasonal migration of Afghan nomads into Pakistan, and Afghanistan's refusal to use its only railway link to the Indian Ocean at Karachi. Relations improved after the resignation of prime minister Mohammad Daoud in 1963.

In July 1973, when a military coup returned Daoud to the presidency, he immediately reactivated the dispute and has since pursued it by diplomacy and propaganda. In response, Pakistan instituted an aggressive policy that included an increased military and official civilian presence in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, and a firm refusal to discuss its policies and programs in the two provinces.

Afghanistan has never publicly gone further than demands for self-determination for the people of Pushtunistan, but most Pakistanis are convinced that incorporation is the Afghan goal. The Soviet Union has backed the Afghan position since 1955, while the US recognizes the Durand Line as an international boundary.

C. South Asia and the Great Powers

Relations between the Great Powers have important repercussions in South Asia. In the 1950s US-Soviet tensions played an important part in determining not only the relations of South Asian nations with the Great Powers, but relations among the South Asian nations themselves. The emergence of China in the 1960s and the detente in Sino-US and US-Soviet relations in the 1970s have also had a significant impact.

The 1950s

Washington's policy of containment during the 1950s put the US at odds with India and led to a military alliance with Pakistan:

—India's policies, such as its ambiguous stand during the Korean conflict and its abstention on the UN vote to condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary, led to serious strains between Washington and New Delhi;

—US efforts to contain the USSR resulted in the inclusion of Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO, and in bilateral defense agreements with the US in 1954 and 1959.

Moscow, after Stalin's death in 1953, placed a high priority on developing close relations with India as a large new nation advocating socialism.

In South Asia, while India bought arms from Western Europe, principally Britain, a major US military supply program, including grant aid, enabled Pakistan to challenge Indian dominance. Nehru claimed the military assistance agreement prevented further progress on resolving the Kashmir dispute.

China, not yet a Great Power, chose the Third World as its forum for international expression and also developed close ties with India. At the same time, India emphasized its own nonalignment and acted as a leader of the Third World.

The 1960s

Beginning in the late 1950s, the growing power of China began to change relationships in the sub-continent:

—China and India began to see each other as rivals for leadership in Asia and in the Third World;

—Sino-Soviet rivalry encouraged close Indo-Soviet relations;

—Pakistan began to see China as a potential ally against India and as early as 1961, entered into negotiations with Peking for a border agreement, which was finally signed in 1963;

—The US, desiring both to offset growing Soviet influence in New Delhi and to contain China, took some tentative steps toward improving relations with New Delhi.

The war in the Himalayas in late 1962 brought most of these trends to a head. The US and UK rushed arms to India to demonstrate their support for New Delhi. Pakistani faith in the US as a protector against India was badly shaken by these actions. The war also pointed up the mutual hostility of Pakistan and China toward India. The USSR, forced to choose between a Communist and a non-Communist country, opted for India. Soviet arms shipments began arriving the following year.

The US continued to be the major arms supplier to Pakistan, but, when the US imposed an embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it was replaced by China.

Decreasing strains in US-Soviet relations during the 1960s were both reflected and encouraged by the parallel policies of the two countries in South Asia:

—Both sought to contain China;

—Both worked for stability in the sub-continent;

—In late 1965, US efforts with India and Pakistan undoubtedly contributed to the receptivity of each country to the eventual Soviet mediation at Tashkent;

—Both sought to increase their influence in India and Pakistan. Following the 1965 war, the USSR improved its relations with Pakistan slightly, at minor cost to its relations with India.

The 1970s

In the early 1970s, there has been some swing back toward the relations existing in the 1950s. The Sino-US detente obviated Washington's interest in India as a vehicle for containing China. The detente also eliminated a major complication in Pakistan's foreign policy, allowing Islamabad to maintain relations with one of its Great Power allies without offending the other. US and Chinese policy toward the subcontinent began to coincide. For example, the policies of the two countries during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war were roughly parallel. Finally, the detente and the continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry, together with Indo-Pakistani hostility, resulted in closer relations between New Delhi and Moscow—symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.

The independence of Bangladesh injected a new factor into the South Asian equation. Dacca's relations with the Great Powers tended to parallel India's. Bangladesh, however, stood in much greater need of economic aid from the US. Its relations with the USSR were limited to some extent by Soviet reluctance to undercut New Delhi's influence in Dacca. China originally refused to have any dealings with the new nation but was expected to extend recognition itself following Pakistani's recognition of Bangladesh in early 1974 and abandonment by Dacca of all plans to place Pakistani POWs on trial for war crimes.

The Future

The beginnings of further shifts in the Great Power - South Asian relationship are already visible. By May 1974, there were hints that China and India had begun moving toward rapprochement. Indo-US relations, badly hurt during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, were improving. The USSR was once again seeking better relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan, for its part, seemed to want a more amicable relationship with Moscow. The effect on Indian and Pakistani relations with the Great Powers of New Delhi's decision to detonate a nuclear device on May 18, 1974 was not yet clear as this edition of the handbook went to press.

Regional Relations

Relations between India and Pakistan have influenced and been influenced by the policies of the smaller nations of the area.

Iran has usually supported Pakistan, providing limited quantities of military supplies and sanctuary for Pakistani civil aircraft during Pakistan's wars with India and using its diplomatic influence on Islamabad's behalf. The Iranian interest is in maintaining a stable and independent nation on its eastern border and in limiting Soviet, Chinese, and Indian influence both in South Asia and farther west. Iran has never, however, pressed its support of Pakistan to the point of actual involvement in combat operations.

Sri Lanka and Nepal have pursued a policy of preserving their independence and freedom of action by playing not only India against Pakistan, but the Great Powers against each other. India seeks, at a minimum, to have no other power dominant in these two countries, and—especially in Nepal—has made special efforts to increase Indian influence.

D. Threats to Internal Stability

Afghanistan

Traditionally, the main threat to any Afghan regime has come from the Pushtu-speaking tribes that have resisted the efforts of the central government to impose its authority on them. At present, the tribes are quiescent. Immediately after the Daoud coup of July 1973, communist sympathizers reportedly assumed positions of influence in the government and military. In mid-1974, however, President Daoud was said to be slowly removing these individuals from their posts.

Bangladesh

Almost from its establishment, the Bangladesh government has been plagued by general lawlessness throughout the country, including robbery, political assassinations, and localized armed resistance to authority. Dacca is hopeful that a campaign begun in Spring 1974 by its security forces, spearheaded by the army, will reduce these threats to its internal stability. There are several small radical groups identifying themselves as communists. These groups hold no political positions and pose little threat to the government. The communists do, however, exert some influence over radical students and labor groups.

India

Widespread poverty and over-population together with language, ethnic, and regional differences and political instability on the state level all contribute to internal instability in India. In 1974, food riots erupted in the states of Gujarat and Bihar, and the army was called upon to assist state security forces to restore order. In the past, Naga and Mizo tribal elements in eastern India have rebelled against the central government in their attempts to gain independence. For the present, the two tribes are quiet, but their basic discontent remains.

Although they do not pose a direct threat to stability, communists exert an important influence on the political life of India. The communist movement is presently split into two major parties and a number of small splinter groups. Although total membership is only 165,000, the various parties have attracted 14 million voters, enabling them to win 49 of the 545 seats in the lower house of parliament as well as a number of state offices.

Nepal

What threat there is to Nepal's internal security comes from a small group of Nepali Congress Party politicians led by former prime minister B. P. Koirala, all of whom are presently in exile in India. Although Koirala's supporters have led student disorders in Nepal, they are not believed capable of mounting a nationwide uprising against the government. Two terrorist bombings occurred in early 1974, however, and more are likely. Communists in Nepal number an estimated 8,000 and are split into pro-Soviet and pro-Peking factions. Communists and their sympathizers have served in the government and in parliament, but the party has its greatest influence with urban groups, students, and educators.

Pakistan

The greatest threat to Pakistan's internal stability remains the possibility of a further breakup of the country. Pushtu-speaking and related tribal elements in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan are pressing for a very large degree of autonomy, and in early 1974 a low-level insurgency existed in Baluchistan.

Civilian governments in Pakistan are also faced with the danger of a military take-over. Military dictatorships have ruled Pakistan for 13 of its first 27 years as an independent nation. At present, Prime Minister Bhutto appears to have the situation under control and to have the loyalty of the armed forces. The military, however, would probably step in to seize power if it appeared that civilian government was unable to function effectively.

Sri Lanka

In April and May 1971, the Bandaranaike government was challenged by a loosely organized insurgency spearheaded by educated, unemployed youths dissatisfied with the government's failure to solve deep-seated economic and social problems. The genesis and development of the insurgency was indigenous and no material assistance was received from outside sources. More than 15,000 dissidents or suspected supporters were eventually apprehended, and the insurrection attempt was put down although isolated, small armed bands were continuing to operate in the jungle areas in 1974. Continuing social and economic problems could precipitate another insurrection at some pont in the future.

There are about 2,800 Communists in Sri Lanka. About 2,000 are in the pro-Moscow party, which is a member of the coalition government; the other 800 are members of the pro-Peking faction and oppose the government.

II. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The 1971 war with Pakistan demonstrated India's pre-eminence as a military power in South Asia. Although Pakistan's military capability remained largely intact following the conflict, the country's leaders recognize that their armed forces are no match for India's. There is little difference between the two forces in terms of leadership, morale, or logistic capability, but the Indian armed forces are much larger and better equipped, and would ultimately overwhelm their foe. India's military strength has, in fact, evolved to the point where it probably could defend itself successfully against a conventional attack by China or a combined Chinese-Pakistani attack.

The key to India's strong position is its massive military expansion program, including development of a domestic armaments industry, begun after the 1962 hostilities with China. India is continuing to purchase sophisticated military equipment from the Soviet Union as well as from East European and Free World countries, and is arranging for production of such items whenever feasible. Pakistan, in turn, has increased its efforts to develop a domestic armaments industry and acquire sophisticated military equipment, primarily through France and the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that military parity with India will ever be restored.

Of the remaining countries in South Asia, only Afghanistan has a creditable defense establishment. Its military potential has traditionally been low, however, owing to the lack of effective training and the poor quality of its personnel. The armed forces of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have no offensive, and limited defensive, capability.

A. India

Ground: The Indian army is capable of successful offensive and defensive operations within South Asia. It could also constitute an effective expeditionary force within the region, using its own resources, or elsewhere in combination with a major power. The Indian army, in conjunction with the paramilitary forces, is capable of maintaining internal security and meeting any civil emergency. The army has a personnel strength of about 1,092,000. Service is not compulsory. Enlistment is permitted between the ages of 17 and 24 for 10, 12, or 15 years of active service. Based on the availability of organized reserves, arms and equipment, training facilities and cadres, administrative machinery, and economic considerations, but without additional logistic support, maximum mobilization could be reached on M plus 90 with 1,175,000 troops. The manpower would come from the Reserve Force (a pool of men who have completed active service), from the Territorial Army,

and from the National Cadet Corps. Among the principal weaknesses of the army are logistics problems stemming from a diversity of equipment and a shortage of junior officers, especially those with technical backgrounds.

Combat and support units are divided into five geographic (territorial) commands, with the majority of troops concentrated either on the western border with Pakistan or in northeastern India. Major tactical units include:

7 corps headquarters
15 infantry divisions
10 mountain divisions
2 armored divisions
2 (independent) infantry brigades
2 (independent) parachute brigades
3 (independent) artillery brigades
7 corps artillery brigades
5 (independent) armored brigades
4 (independent) air defense brigades

Ten infantry divisions, an armored division, and several independent brigades are deployed against Pakistan, while six mountain divisions (in northeastern India) and one infantry division (in Ladakh) are stationed across the border from Chinese forces in Tibet and Sinkiang.*

Arms and equipment are a mixture of imported and indigenously produced or assembled equipment. The USSR supplanted the UK and the US as the principal provider of military equipment after 1965. Foreign technical assistance is minimal; the quality of maintenance is good. A small number of personnel are sent abroad for staff or advanced technical training, but the army itself conducts a program covering all requirements, from basic individual through advanced unit and high-level command and staff training. Many of the Indian army schools accept students from less-developed countries.** On occasion, training missions are sent out of the country.

Despite problems stemming from a diversity of equipment, the army logistic system is capable of maintaining the forces. Vulnerable lines of communication, however, could jeopardize Indian forces in Kashmir and

**Chinese forces along the borders with India include three infantry divisions, one independent artillery regiment, and ten border defense regiments. No combat aircraft are stationed permanently at airfields in Tibet.*

***Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ghana, Egypt, Kenya, Iraq, Malaysia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Tanzania, Singapore, Sudan, the Republic of Yemen, and Zambia send students.*

northeastern India. The Banihal Road is the only major land communications link in Kashmir, and its severance would seriously hamper any operations in the area. An alternate but less satisfactory route is available. Reliance on a single-track railroad from West Bengal to Arunchal Pradesh, opposite China, has also been a significant logistic weakness, but this has been alleviated by the emergence of a friendly Bangladesh that would probably give transit rights to Indian forces. An extensive system of depots is maintained throughout India. Stocks of ammunition, POL, and other stores are considered sufficient to support a maximum combat effort of at least 45 days.

Air: The air force is capable of providing air defense and engaging in strategic and tactical operations within South Asia, as well as assisting in civil emergencies. Its main strengths are:

- the availability of ample manpower;
- the high morale and individual capabilities of personnel;
- the ongoing program to acquire modern aircraft from outside sources, while simultaneously developing an indigenous manufacture/assembly capability.

The principal weakness is the diversity of aircraft (over 35 types). With such variety, there is considerable difficulty in resupply, procurement of spare parts, and training of qualified pilots and maintenance personnel. Other weaknesses include the lack of an effective strategic strike force, fuel shortages, maintenance problems with the MIG-21/Fishbed, easily disrupted landline communications in the air defense system, and lack of an all-weather air-to-air missile.

There are 105,000 men in the air force, of whom 2,300 are pilots. The aircraft inventory totals 1,399, including 331 supersonic and 260 subsonic fighters, 38 light bombers, 213 transports, 16 reconnaissance, 218 helicopters, and 323 other aircraft. The air force is organized into 95 units: 8 day fighter; 9 fighter/interceptor; 15 fighter-bomber; 3 light bomber; 1 strategic reconnaissance; 1 maritime reconnaissance; 13 transport; 14 helicopter; 1 VIP; and 30 miscellaneous training and utility. Most of the major combat units are strategically located along the border areas. More than half of the flying units are based in the western portion of the country. Prior to any hostilities, a wide dispersal of forces and aircraft to numerous forward locations could be expected.

The air defense network is composed of radar, aircraft, missile, and antiaircraft artillery units. The radar screen is oriented largely toward the

north and northwest. The net provides radar surveillance over virtually all of the common land frontiers shared with Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir, the People's Republic of China, Bangladesh, and Burma. This system operates creditably, considering the limited resources available and the fact that the system must defend a 2,400-mile border facing the Himalayan mountains. The principal weaknesses are equipment shortages and vulnerable communications.

The SA-2 SAM system, used in the defense of significant military/industrial targets, includes five main complexes consisting of 19 active sites (squadrons). The Fan Song F radar has been identified with the system, enhancing its electronic counter-countermeasure and low-altitude capability. Indian army antiaircraft weapons proved the most effective defense against low-level ground attacks and strikes on airfields during the 1971 war.

The air force has a minor strategic bombing capability that would permit it to strike all targets in Pakistan. MIG-21/Fishbed are used in the interceptor or ground support role, depending on mission priority. Fifteen fighter-bomber squadrons (SU-7/Fitter, HF-24 Marut, and F-56 Hawker Hunter day fighters) are also available for strike operations. Transport capability is built around 13 squadrons of medium and light transports, including aging C-47 and C-119G Packets, DHC-4 Caribous, AN-12 Cubs, and MI-4 Hound and MI-8 Hip helicopters. It is estimated that the air force is capable of transporting one of the army's parachute brigades on a single lift under optimum conditions. Inadequate logistic support would preclude sustained operations on this scale. Pilots are well trained and effective in aerial resupply under visual conditions.

The air force sends students to the USSR for training on the various pieces of Soviet-provided equipment, and Soviet technical specialists in India provide guidance in specialized fields. Students also attend staff colleges in the UK and Australia on an exchange basis, and Egypt and France have conducted training programs for air and ground crews. The Indian air force also trains a limited number of students from other Asian and African countries.

Air force logistics are hampered by the many types of aircraft. Maintenance is further complicated by an inadequate number of trained personnel, shortages of test equipment, insufficient spare parts, and lengthy lead times in the procurement of spare parts for foreign-made aircraft. The air force normally has an operationally ready rate of 70 percent, but current fuel shortages are probably degrading this rate.

Navy: The Indian navy, with 33,000 men (including air arm) and the largest, most potent fleet in South Asia, is capable of successful offensive or defensive operations in the region.

The navy has 1 antisubmarine warfare support aircraft carrier, 2 light cruisers, 6 submarines (Foxtrot class), 19 destroyer/destroyer-escort vessels (including 9 Petya class and 1 indigenously produced Leander class), 8 Osa-class large guided-missile boats, 16 patrol vessels, 8 mine-warfare ships, 3 amphibious ships, and a large number of auxiliary and service craft. The Osa boats, equipped with the Styx missile, are unmatched in the area and were a decisive factor in the naval engagements during the 1971 conflict.

While the navy's antisubmarine warfare capability is effective within confined areas, the small number of antisubmarine warfare ships and aircraft would preclude simultaneous patrol of all coastal waters. Another serious shortcoming is the paucity of minesweepers.

The main operating bases and principal activities of the navy are in the ports of Bombay on the west coast, Cochin in the south, and Vishakhapatnam on the east coast. The majority of ships and craft are based at Bombay, with most of the remainder at Vishakhapatnam and a few at Cochin. The Western Fleet, operating out of Bombay, consists of the aircraft carrier, the 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers*, 12 destroyer escorts (including 4 Petyas), 17 coastal patrol ships/craft (including the 8 Osas), all 8 of the minesweepers, and the majority of the auxiliaries. The Eastern Fleet, working out of Vishakhapatnam, consists of 5 destroyer escorts (Petyas), all 6 Foxtrot-class submarines*, 3 coastal patrol ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 5 auxiliaries. In addition to operating along the east coast, some of these ships are based temporarily at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. Ships and craft based in southern India report to the Southern Naval Command at Cochin. These include 2 coastal patrol ships and 1 auxiliary. The navy sends a small number of personnel to the UK, US, and USSR for training, while at the same time it trains naval personnel from several Mideast, African, and Asian-Pacific nations.

The logistic system of the navy has two major problems. First, the navy must depend upon outside sources for most of its ships and craft, supplies, and modern equipment. Second, Bombay is the only base capable of undertaking major repair and resupply of the forces afloat. Nevertheless, the navy's logistic capability is increasing.

**One is in an active status, while the other is in an unmaintained reserve.*

***In the future, some submarines may be based at Bombay.*

Modest facilities at Cochin and the east coast ports of Calcutta and Vishakhapatnam are being expanded in an effort to decrease reliance upon outside sources for logistic needs. The Mazagon docks at Bombay have successfully undertaken the Leander project, and the Garden Reach workshops at Calcutta have built a number of small naval ships. Stocks of fuel and ammunition could probably support a maximum combat effort for two months.

The Indian naval air arm has 1,500 men and 90 aircraft. During the December 1971 war, Alize and Sea Hawk aircraft, in conjunction with the surface blockade, effectively ensured the isolation of East Pakistan.

The Naval Aircraft Repair Organization at Cochin is responsible for depot-level aircraft maintenance. Maintenance procedures are inadequate, however, and must be supplemented by technical teams from Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd.

Paramilitary: India's numerous paramilitary forces, with occasional assistance from the army, are capable of maintaining law and order, conducting counterinsurgency operations, and functioning as light infantry under army control during wartime situations. The principal organizations are:

Assam Rifles (AR) (21 battalions/30,000 men)
Central Reserve Police (CRP) (63 battalions/57,000 men)
Border Security Force (BSF) (80 battalions/76,000 men)

The AR, BSF, and CRP are normally controlled by the central Ministry of Home Affairs. The AR, BSF, and CRP battalions are equipped with standard infantry weapons and equipment. The BSF also has indigenous artillery units, a small naval force (two tugs and three small patrol boats), and a small air wing (four Dakota transport planes).

B. Pakistan

Ground: In the event of full-scale war with India, the 390,000-man army could initially defend Pakistan successfully, but it ultimately would succumb to India's military superiority. Pakistan's offensive capabilities were relatively unaffected by the 1971 war, but the army could not mount an attack against India with any real expectation of success. Augmented by the paramilitary Civil Armed Forces and Federal Security Force, the army can maintain Pakistan's internal security.

The 1971 war caused a morale problem within the ranks. There was a general belief that senior military officaldom rather than the army was responsible for the defeat and the loss of East Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto retired several military officials and replaced them with generals loyal to him. He has also sought to shift responsibility away from the army by focusing the blame on former President Yahya Khan and his supporters.

There is a selective service system, but voluntary enlistments are more than sufficient to meet the army's manpower requirements. Enlistment is permitted from age 17 for a seven-year first term to be followed with re-enlistments of three-year increments. There are no organized reserve units, but personnel completing regular enlistment serve eight years on the reserve rolls. Pakistan is creating a national guard under army control to assist in internal defense and civic action tasks during periods of stress. Its present strength is unknown. In the event of war, reservists and the national guard would be called up, and should additional manpower be required, conscription could be implemented. Also available for integration into the regular forces is the paramilitary Civil Armed Forces composed of the Pakistan Rangers, the Frontier Corps, and the Frontier Constabulary, with an estimated combined strength of 38,500. No significant expansion of the army would be possible without substantial outside assistance. At present, with materiel assistance from abroad, the army mobilization capacity at M-plus-90 is estimated at 450,000 personnel.

The army has deployed the majority of its fighting force opposing India. Eleven infantry divisions and two armored divisions are based in permanent cantonments or in field locations from the Rann of Kutch northward into the disputed Jammu and Kashmir state. Infantry divisions are stationed near Peshawar and Quetta to meet any possible threat from Afghanistan through the Khyber or Khojak passes, respectively.

Major tactical units include:

5 corps headquarters
13 infantry divisions*
2 armored divisions
3 (independent) armored brigades
5 corps artillery brigades
5 corps armored reconnaissance regiments
1 special services group (Special Forces/brigade equivalent)
2 antiaircraft artillery brigades

** Another infantry division is reportedly being raised.*

The army is equipped with an assortment of arms from both communist and noncommunist nations. Because of inadequate inventories of spare parts and a lack of trained logistic personnel, this diversity of equipment is a major weakness for the army. Ground forces equipment requirements are currently met through Chinese and European sources and by limited indigenous production.

Only a small number of military personnel are sent out of the country for specialized training or attendance at senior military schools. The army has provided, and is continuing to provide, limited training assistance to several Middle Eastern and African nations, including Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Nigeria, and Uganda. Most of this training is conducted at the combat arms centers in the respective nations or at their senior service schools.

The logistic system is the army's weakest area. Logistics support in West Pakistan in 1971 appeared adequate, but toward the end of the fighting supplies—especially ammunition and POL—ran low. Depots for all classes of supplies are located near troop concentrations, and the army has sought to maintain a 30-day level. Present supply levels are unknown, but considering difficulties encountered during the war, it is anticipated that if the country is once again blockaded and fails to control the air, the army would be unable to carry on sustained combat operations for more than 30 days.

Air Force: The air force is capable of performing air defense, ground support, and other tactical support tasks. Dependence on multiple foreign supply sources and a shortage of spare parts, however, tend to impair effectiveness. These logistic difficulties are offset to some extent by the overall capability of Pakistani pilots and technical personnel.

The air force numbers 17,100 personnel, of whom 500 are pilots. The aircraft inventory totals 511, including 12 light bombers, 179 supersonic fighters, 93 subsonic fighters, 5 reconnaissance aircraft, 10 transports, 67 helicopters, and 145 utility/trainers. It is organized into 21 units: 1 light bomber, 12 fighter, 1 transport, 1 search and rescue, and 6 training and miscellaneous.

Air defense is the primary role of the air force. The mainstay of the air defense inventory is the squadron of all-weather Mirage III-E fighters. The Chinese-built MIG-19 and the aging F-86 are used to supplement the Mirages but have no all-weather capability. While the shortage of all-weather aircraft

degrades the effectiveness of the air defense system somewhat, Pakistani pilots, often reputed to be the best in South Asia, derive maximum effectiveness from the available combat aircraft. Pakistan's air defense aircraft are supported by contiguous radar coverage along most of the common border with India, the only exception being the Bahawalpur area of central Pakistan.

Air transport consists of eight C-130 transports, two of them on loan from civil airlines. The fleet of C-130s has a potential capability of lifting about a battalion (800 men) on a single lift under optimum conditions. It may also be configured to bomb area targets during hostilities. Pakistan International Airline's 16 civil transport aircraft, including Boeing 707s and DC-10s and some 12,000 personnel, can readily be mobilized in an emergency situation. Prior to and during hostilities with India, PIA aircraft were used extensively to ferry troops from West to East Pakistan.

The serviceability of the air force inventory is not known. Although the quality of maintenance is generally good, efforts to maintain a high state of operational readiness of aircraft are plagued by a severe shortage of spare parts and the diversity of sources of supply.

There are no known aviation trainees in foreign countries. A considerable number of air force personnel were trained in the US prior to 1965. A limited number of pilots and ground crew personnel have also received training in France, and 60 personnel completed TU-16 training in the People's Republic of China in 1973. No TU-16s are in Pakistan, but they would be available in the event of war with India. Pakistan has provided aviation training to several Middle East and African countries. Exporting the air force's technical expertise could continue to be one of Pakistan's major foreign commitments.

Navy: The Pakistani navy is a small but expanding force capable of conducting limited escort, patrol, and minesweeping operations. The primary mission of the 9,900-man navy is the defense of coastal waters and the port of Karachi. Although a program of expansion and modernization is under way, the navy's regional importance will remain well below that of India. It could not conduct sustained combat operations without outside assistance. Its operational forces include 1 antiaircraft light cruiser, 3 attack submarines, 4 destroyers, 2 destroyer-escorts, 13 motor gunboats, 4 hydrofoil torpedo boats, 7 minesweepers, and 3 auxiliary ships.

Salient strengths include a small but relatively modern minesweeping and submarine force, good individual training, and the military traditions of its personnel. Selected personnel are sent to the [redacted] and the US for

25X6A

specialized training. Weaknesses include the age of major surface combatants, inability to defend against high-speed attack aircraft, inadequate shore-based air support for naval operations, vulnerability to blockades, and a reliance upon outside sources for most materiel and logistic support.

As a result of the 1971 conflict with India, the navy is seeking a variety of weapons platforms to offset the striking power of the Indian navy. Twelve Shanghai II - class motor gunboats and four Huchwan-class hydrofoil torpedo boats have been acquired from the PRC. France may provide Exocet cruise missiles, a fourth Daphne-class attack submarine, and a small number of Breguet-Atlantique aircraft for maritime reconnaissance. The [redacted] has agreed to provide six Sea King helicopters and two Whitby-class destroyer-escorts. 25X6

The navy's principal logistic facilities are located in the Karachi area. Progress is being made in the areas of supply, repair, and maintenance, but the navy still relies on foreign sources for much of its equipment and supplies. All of Pakistan's ships and craft can be overhauled or repaired at Karachi, using the naval dockyard or commercial facilities. A joint naval and commercial facility is under construction at Phitti Creek, 10 miles southeast of Karachi. When work at this site is completed, it is expected to accommodate ships up to 50,000 tons, larger than any ship the navy is expected to acquire.

Paramilitary: Pakistan's paramilitary forces, with the backing of the army, are capable of maintaining internal security, conducting counter-guerrilla operations, and, during wartime, acting as light infantry. The principal paramilitary units are:

Civil Armed Forces

Pakistan Rangers (8,000 men)
Frontier Corps (24,000 men)
Frontier Constabulary (6,500 men)

Federal Security Force (13,000 men)

Under normal conditions, the paramilitary units are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The Civil Armed Forces are organized into battalions and company units. The complete breakdown of units is not available because of expansion of the forces, on the one hand, and the loss or capture of personnel during the war, on the other. In time of emergency or war, the

Pakistan Rangers and Frontier Constabulary remain subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The Civil Armed Forces units use standard light infantry weapons, primarily British WW II models; however, there is a deficiency in signal and transport equipment. The Frontier Corps also has some light artillery and armored cars. The Federal Security Force units, raised in 1973, are supplied with small arms, riot-control equipment, and sufficient motor transport to ensure mobility.

C. Bangladesh

Ground: The Bangladesh army is not capable of waging successful offensive or conventional defensive operations against neighboring countries. In conjunction with paramilitary forces, however, it could wage an extensive guerrilla campaign in defense of the country. It is also capable of maintaining internal security in urban areas. The army has an estimated strength of 25,000. Information on enlistment and terms of service is sparse. Mobilization plans are unknown, but the potential for augmentation of ground forces is good. The large number of former guerrillas constitute a source of troops.

Combat and support units are subordinated to five brigade headquarters, which have both administrative and tactical functions. The heaviest concentration of troops is in the Dacca area. Major tactical units include:

5 brigade headquarters
18 infantry battalions
3 artillery regiments
1 heavy mortar regiment
1 armored regiment

Arms and equipment inventories contain a mixture of equipment provided by India or captured from Pakistan. The principal weaknesses of the army are a lack of modern equipment, an inadequate logistic system, a low state of combat readiness, and a lack of experienced high-ranking officers. The Bangladesh government has indicated an interest in obtaining modern military equipment for its army. Specialized military schooling is being made available in India, but the government is interested in training students elsewhere as well. In-country training courses are few in number and poor in quality.

Air: The mission of the Bangladesh air force is to provide air defense and tactical air support for ground and naval forces, and airlift support for national civic action and relief programs. Often described as an "air force in training," the force has yet to demonstrate a capability to perform any part of its assigned mission.

There are between 1,000 and 1,500 personnel in the air force, including approximately 60 pilots, navigators, and flight engineers. Some repatriated Bengalees have probably been integrated into the force structure.

The aircraft inventory totals 43 aircraft, including 27 fighters, 3 transports, 7 helicopters, and 6 trainer/utility aircraft. Most of this inventory, including 17 MIG-21/Fishbeds, was acquired during 1973. The aircraft probably are organized into three squadrons: 1 fighter; 1 transport; and 1 helicopter. All aircraft are stationed in the Dacca and Chittagong areas.

Air force operations, maintenance, and other support functions are severely degraded by a shortage of trained personnel. Extensive technical and flying training programs have been established by the Soviet Union. In addition to the programs conducted in the Soviet Union, training on the MIGs, helicopters, and transport aircraft is carried out in Bangladesh under the direction of Soviet advisers and instructors. Future operational effectiveness will depend on the success of these programs.

Navy: The Bangladesh navy is a small riverine and coastal patrol force. Its strength is in excess of 450 personnel. Missions include the prevention of smuggling and other illegal activities, the protection of coastal maritime traffic, the policing of inland waterways, and participation in disaster relief operations. Naval headquarters is located at Dacca. Ships are deployed at Chittagong and Khulna.

The naval ship inventory is made up of four indigenously produced river patrol boats and one 150-ton seaward defense boat provided by India in April 1973. Future acquisitions may include an unknown number of Yugoslav gunboats of World War II vintage and a second seaward defense boat from India.

As the navy expands, Indian influence will continue to predominate. Approximately 100 personnel have been sent to India for training at Bombay and Cochin on such subjects as sonar, radar, and telecommunications. The Indian navy has also sent an adviser to Bangladesh to assist in the establishment of indigenous training facilities.

Paramilitary: Bangladesh's paramilitary forces are capable of coping with sporadic cases of internal unrest, but not with widespread organized dissidence. They are not capable of policing the country's borders. In wartime they could function effectively as light infantry or guerrillas. The Bangladesh

Rifles (13,000) and the National Defense Force (16,000) are equipped with small arms, mostly bolt-action rifles, and some signal equipment. National Defense Force personnel have received some training from members of the Indian Military Assistance Mission.

D. Afghanistan

Ground: The Afghan army is incapable of defending the country from outside aggression. In conjunction with paramilitary forces, however, it is capable of maintaining internal security, except possibly in a situation of widespread tribal unrest. The army has a personnel strength of about 78,700. Military service is compulsory, and personnel are selected by local leaders and tribes for two years' active service. Based on the availability of reserves, arms and equipment, training facilities and cadre, administrative machinery, and economic considerations, but without outside logistic support, the army's mobilization capacity is estimated to be 103,500 men at M plus 90 days. The manpower would come from reserve officers and previously conscripted personnel.

The principal weaknesses of the army include rudimentary administrative, logistic, and maintenance systems; a shortage of trained leaders and technicians; lack of adequate transportation and communication facilities; and dependence upon the Soviet Union for almost all of its materiel.

Geographical areas of responsibility are assigned to three corps headquarters and four provincial divisions. The bulk of the army—seven infantry divisions and all three armored divisions—is located around Kabul and along the border with Pakistan. Major tactical units* include:

3 corps headquarters
10 infantry divisions
3 armored divisions
2 artillery regiments
3 mountain brigades
1 commando regiment (Special Forces equivalent)
1 republican guard regiment
1 airborne battalion

**The size of an Afghan infantry division is between 4,000 and 8,000 men; an Afghan armored division is equivalent to a reinforced US armored battalion. The independent regiments are comparable to an understrength US brigade.*

Almost all of the equipment in the army's inventory is of Soviet origin. While most items, notably the artillery, are of World War II vintage, modern equipment has been introduced in increasing amounts since the late 1960s.

The army logistic system is only marginally capable of supporting the forces. Shortages of spare parts and poor maintenance caused by technical incompetence continue to result in low levels of operational readiness. In the case of newer or more complicated equipment, Soviet advisers and technicians are required to perform essential maintenance. Large numbers of personnel are sent abroad, primarily to the Soviet Union, for basic officer, staff officer, and technical training.

Air: The air defense force is incapable of defending the nation's airspace and supporting large ground-force operations. The air defense force can effectively assist units conducting internal security operations, but its usefulness is based more on its psychological impact than its tactical capability. Tactical effectiveness is restricted by a lack of air-ground communications, a shortage of qualified maintenance personnel, few dispersal airfields, insufficient fuel storage facilities and navigational aids, and inefficient logistical procedures and practices.

There are 8,100 men in the air force, of whom 150 are pilots. The inventory totals 267 aircraft, including 54 supersonic and 89 subsonic fighters, 28 light bombers, 36 transports, 28 helicopters, and 32 other aircraft. These forces are organized into six wings: 3 day fighter; 1 bomber; 1 transport; and 1 training. The aircraft are concentrated in the vicinity of Kaul and at Shindand airfield, near the Afghan-Iranian border.

Air defense capability rests with the small force of supersonic MIG-21, SU-7, and subsonic MIG-17 fighter aircraft, an antiaircraft artillery division, a surface-to-air missile brigade, and a radar brigade. This modest capability is keyed primarily to the defense of the Kabul area.

The overall effectiveness of the air defense components is generally low. The force is capable only of relatively uncomplicated actions and is vulnerable to low-level, high-speed attack from any direction. The SA-2 SAM system, used in defense of the Kabul area, consists of three deployed firing sites. The last known practice firing occurred in 1971. The combat effectiveness of this force is probably limited.

Ground support capabilities are negligible; bombing and interdiction can be carried out only under optimum weather conditions. Air transport capability is slight because of the lack of suitable aircraft and trained crews.

The training establishment in Afghanistan is rudimentary. Some pilot and aircraft technical training is performed in-country, and a technical refresher course for officers is conducted at the technical school associated with the Afghan Military Academy. Soviet advisers and technicians attached to the air defense force provide on-the-job training for radar, missile, antiaircraft, and aircraft maintenance personnel. Nearly all primary, advanced, transition pilot training, meteorological, and enlisted technical training is conducted in the USSR.

The air defense force's ability to maintain aircraft and other air defense equipment is generally poor. The major deficiency is complete dependence on the USSR and other Communist countries for replacement aircraft, spare parts, armament, electronics, missiles, engineering, training, and POL. Without continuing Soviet assistance, even the small existing capability to support air operations would deteriorate rapidly.

Navy: None

Paramilitary: The Gendarmerie, Afghanistan's sole paramilitary force, is capable of coping with low-level tribal dissidence and minor civil disorders, policing the borders, and functioning as light infantry under army control during wartime situations. The 14,200-man force is controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The organization's 13 regiments and 1 mobile unit are equipped with bolt-action rifles and a minimum amount of signal equipment and transport.

E. Nepal

Ground: The 20,000-man Royal Nepalese Army, the country's only military service, is incapable of waging offensive or defensive operations against neighboring India or the People's Republic of China. The army is capable of maintaining internal security in the Kathmandu Valley and the plains area across southern Nepal, but not throughout the country. There is no compulsory military service. Enlistment is permitted from age 17 for a period of ten years of active service. Mobilization capability at M-plus-90 is negligible.

Internal security considerations dictate the general deployment of army forces. Three infantry brigades are deployed on the plains adjoining India, while a palace brigade, an infantry brigade, and a parachute battalion are located in the Kathmandu Valley.

Major tactical units include:

5 brigade headquarters
12 infantry battalions

1 parachute battalion
1 artillery regiment

An airborne support transport wing, with two Short Skyvan SRS 3 aircraft and one Alouette III helicopter, provides the lift capability to the parachute battalion.

The army is equipped with an assortment of weapons, mostly obsolete, obtained from either India or the UK, but an extensive modernization program is under way. Modern small arms are being obtained from India. Recent deliveries have included six 76-mm. howitzers and eighteen 120-mm. mortars. Additional communications equipment and motor transport is under consideration. Basic military training is accomplished in Nepal. Advanced officer and most technical training is undertaken in France, India, the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.

The army's logistic capability is extremely poor. Mobility and communications are severely restricted by the country's rugged terrain and lack of adequate transport. Staff planning at the highest levels frequently fails to consider logistics, and procedures for timely resupply of materiel do not exist. A scarcity of technically trained administrative and maintenance personnel further compounds these problems. Present supply levels are unknown, but it is believed they are adequate to support the army's internal security mission.

Air: None

Navy: None

Paramilitary: None

F. Sri Lanka

Ground: The Sri Lanka army is a rudimentary military organization, patterned along British lines, with the missions of territorial defense and internal security. The army has only a token capability for defense against external attack; it is organized and trained primarily as an internal security force whose responsibilities include prevention of smuggling and illicit immigration, and participation in civic action and economic self-sufficiency programs. The army is capable, in conjunction with the police, of maintaining internal security under normal conditions.

The insurrection in 1971, however, underscored the inability of the army to cope quickly and effectively with widespread insurgency. While it acquired some combat experience in the insurgency, and has since received a considerable amount of new equipment, the army still suffers from a dependence on foreign sources for its materiel, and has not yet corrected the serious command and control problems evident in its 1971 operations. Presently more than half of the army is deployed near Colombo to protect the city's vital port facilities and assist the police in maintaining order.

The army consists of the Regular Force backed up by three reserve components: the Volunteer Force, the Regular Force Reserve, and the Volunteer Force Reserve. The Regular Force, with a strength of 9,000, is composed of three infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance regiment, and various support elements. The Volunteer Force, used to augment the Regular Force, maintains about half of its 9,000 personnel on active duty at all times. The Regular Force Reserve and the Volunteer Force Reserve are inactive reserve manpower pools used to augment the Regular and Volunteer Forces when necessary.

There is no compulsory service; enlistment is permitted from the age of 18 for five years of active service. At present, the army's mobilization capacity, without external logistic support, is 25,000 troops at M plus 90. External military assistance would increase the capacity to 29,000.

Arms and equipment are mostly of World War II British manufacture. Some modern equipment, primarily armored personnel carriers and field guns, was obtained from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, respectively, in 1971. Basic and some advanced training of army personnel is accomplished in Sri Lanka. Training of technical and senior officers is taken in India and, to a lesser extent, in the UK.

The army's logistic system is adequate for the accomplishment of its internal security mission. Supply levels are believed sufficient to support full-scale operations for 30 days. The island's road and rail networks meet normal peacetime requirements.

Air: The air force effectively performs its assigned mission, which includes provision of support to civic action projects, prevention of illicit smuggling and immigration, internal security operations, VIP transport, liaison, and air-sea rescue.

There are 2,300 men in the air force, of whom 43 are pilots. The aircraft inventory totals 53, including 5 day fighters, 5 transports, 15

helicopters, and 28 miscellaneous aircraft. The air force is organized into five units—1 fighter, 1 transport, 2 helicopter, and 1 training—which operate mainly from two airfields: Bandaranaike International, near Colombo, and China Bay, near Trincomalee.

The air force has a modest close air support capability using five Fresco (MIG-17) day fighters and a small number of armed T-51 trainers and OH-13 Sioux helicopters. The transport inventory of one Convair 440 and four DH-114 Heron light transports, together with Sioux, Bell 206A Jet Ranger, and Hoodlum helicopters, is capable of supporting platoon (US-size) operations. This capability is considered adequate to meet Sri Lanka's modest military transport needs. The helicopter force is also employed in short-range search and rescue operations, and adequately assists in anti-insurgency and anti-smuggling operations and prevention of illegal immigration.

The only air defense capability is the army's 4th Field Artillery Regiment, which has antiaircraft batteries in the Colombo and China Bay areas. Equipment is obsolete and inadequate.

The air force has instituted a successful and growing tourist flying service, and this has provided a major impetus to improving the air force's effectiveness. The operation has significantly increased pilot flying time, with a corresponding improvement in pilot proficiency. It has also provided a major boost to air force morale, and has created a foreign exchange earning capacity which can support spare parts acquisition and an aircraft replacement program.

Air force training programs have been upgraded substantially during the past two years. Flight training now extends over a 24-month period, and the attrition rate is high as a result of the rigid standards recently imposed. A high safety record has been achieved through the development of a strict flying standards program. Pilots generally average between 40 and 100 hours per month; the transportation and helicopter squadrons achieve the higher figures. Nonflying training of officers and technical training of enlisted men are increasingly being done at home. A few officers and enlisted men continue to train in India and the UK, but returning students are immediately assigned as teachers. A good start has been made toward self-sufficiency in technical training.

Supply and maintenance systems are rudimentary but are facilitated by the fact that all aircraft are stationed at two easily accessible airfields. While standards have improved, the air force remains capable of performing only

minor maintenance. Major overhaul of aircraft normally is done in the country of origin. There is a shortage of spare parts in general, but parts for the recently acquired US aircraft should be readily available through commercial sources.

Navy: The 2,600-man navy is a small coastal patrol and internal security force. Its operating inventory consists of a World War II - vintage patrol destroyer escort, 5 Shanghai II - class motor gunboats, 23 small patrol craft, 2 auxiliaries, and 1 service craft. One hydrofoil patrol boat is in reserve.

The navy's small size precludes defense against even a minor naval attack. Its antismuggling capability is also inadequate. It has had slightly better success, however, in its operations against illegal immigration; these operations are conducted in conjunction with army and air force units.

The navy's operational effectiveness has been severely restricted by a number of factors, including shallowness of coastal waters, uncharted and continually shifting sandbars, and lack of navigational aids in the Palk Strait between India and Sri Lanka. The navy is further hampered by poor seamanship and a lack of effective leadership at all command levels. Genuine professional interest is absent throughout the officer corps, and sea duty is considered a drudgery and a bore. Enthusiasm has increased somewhat with the acquisition of the PRC gunboats, and the captain of the navy is attempting to obtain a replacement for the aging patrol frigate. Inadequate maintenance and training facilities will likely offset this transitory surge of professionalism, however, and it is considered unlikely that the navy will significantly increase its capabilities in the near future.

During 1973 the Soviet Union offered to supply Sri Lanka with a Petya-class destroyer-escort, but the Sri Lanka government decided against the offer. At present the navy is looking for a craft comparable to a 95-foot US coast guard cutter.

Navy headquarters is located at Colombo. The principal operating base is at Karainagar, with secondary bases at Trincomalee, Tangalla, and Kalpitiya. The navy is constantly beset with supply problems caused by antiquated and poorly maintained equipment, cumbersome material procurement procedures, and poor administration. The problem of excessive delays in procuring materiel, especially spare parts, is compounded by the fact that the navy still has obsolete equipment for which spare parts are no longer in stock; these must be manufactured locally or procured in the UK at considerable cost. Spare parts for the Shanghai II gunboats, however, are readily obtainable from the PRC.

Paramilitary: None

Table 1

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES [1]

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Afghanistan	Nepal	Sri Lanka
ARMY						
Personnel	1,092,000	390,000	25,000	78,700	20,000	9,000
Combat [2]	625,000	253,000	15,000	56,200	16,600	5,500
Tanks						
AMX-13 (France)	60	....	....	....	....	....
M24 Chaffe (US)	....	....	4	....	....	....
PT-76 (USSR)	150	....	....	....	....	....
Total Light	210	....	4	....	....	....
Centurion (UK)	180	....	....	....	....	....
M-4 Sherman (US)	....	160	....	....	....	....
M-47/48 Patton (US)	....	265	....	....	....	....
T-34 (PRC)	....	50	....	200(USSR)	....	....
T-54	220(Czech)	50(USSR)	....	270(USSR)	....	....
T-55	640(USSR/Poland)	10(USSR)	....	54(USSR)	....	....
T-59 (PRC)	....	600	....	....	....	....
T-62 (USSR)	....	....	....	14	....	....
Vickers/Vijayanta (UK/Indigenous)	470	....	....	....	....	....
Other [3]	205	70	....	30	....	....
Total Medium	1,715	1,205	....	568	....	....
Artillery [4]						
100-mm. and over	820	700	12	460	0	0
Up to 100-mm	1,840	695	6	816	10	52
Mortars						
100-mm. and over	720	275	20	270	22	10
Up to 100-mm	8,810	4,000	400	540	235	54
AAA [5]						
57-mm. and over	0	20	0	170	0	0
20- to 57-mm	1,200	425	0	185	2	24
APC [6]	420	405	0	330	0	10
Armored [7]	710	220	0	48	0	54

[1] *All figures are estimates; it should be noted that the Pakistani army is undergoing rapid expansion; inventories include major items of equipment either in the hands of troops or serviceable in depot.*

[2] *Combat personnel are defined as either combat, combat support, or combat service support troops serving with division or separate brigade or battalion formations.*

[3] *Figure includes tanks outfitted with bridge-laying, dozer, or mine-flailing equipment, plus recovery vehicles.*

[4] *Figure includes self-propelled artillery, assault guns, anti-tank guns, and rocket launchers.*

[5] *Figure includes self-propelled AAA.*

[6] *Figure includes infantry combat vehicles.*

[7] *Figure includes reconnaissance vehicles.*

Table 1 (Continued)

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES[1]

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Afghanistan	Nepal	Sri Lanka
AIR DEFENSE						
Personnel	Unknown	Unknown	0	5,300	0	0
Missiles						
Surface-to-Air SA-2	est 480	0	0	120	0	0
No. Launchers SA-2	est 126	0	0	NA	0	0
No. Sites SA-2	est 19	0	0	3	0	0
AIR FORCE						
Personnel	105,000	17,100	1,000 1,500	8,100	Included in Army	2,300
Aircraft						
Jet Bombers (light) Canberra B (1) 58 (UK, New Zealand)	38	0	0	0	0	0
Canberra B-57B (UK)	0	12	0	0	0	0
IL-28/Beagle (PRC)	0	0	0	28	0	0
Total	38	12	0	28	0	0
Jet Fighters						
Supersonic						
SU-7/Fitter (USSR)	79	0	0	21	...	....
MIG-21/Fishbed (USSR)	188[1]	0	17	33	....	....
HF-24 Marut (Indigenous)	64	0	0	....	....	....
F-104A and B (US)	0	5[2]	0	....	....	....
MIG-19/Farmer D (PRC)	0	125[3]	0	....	....	....
Mirage III-E (France)	0	21	0	....	....	....
Mirage 5 (France)	0	28	0	....	....	....
Subtotal	331	179	17	54	....	..
Subsonic						
Gnat 1 (UK, Indigenous)	178	0	0	....	....	....
Hawker Hunter F-56 (UK)	62	0	0	....	....	....
Vampire FB-52 (UK)	20	0	0	....	....	....
F-86F Sabre (US)	0	47	10(Pak)	....	....	....
Sabre MK-6 (F-86) (West Germany)	0	46	0	....	....	....
MIG-17/Fresco (USSR)	....	....	....	89	....	5
Subtotal	260	93	10	89	....	5
Total	591	272	27	143	....	5

Table 1 (Continued)

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES[1]

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Afghanistan	Nepal	Sri Lanka
AIR FORCE *(Continued)*						
Reconnaissance						
Canberra PR-57 (UK)	8	0	....	....	....	....
Mirage III-R (France)	0	3	....	....	....	....
RT-33A (US)	0	2	....	....	....	....
L1049 Super Constellation (US)	8	0	....	....	....	....
Total	16	5	....	....	....	....
Transports						
Medium						
TU-124/Cookpot (USSR)	3	0	....	0	....	....
C-119G Packet (US)	53	0	....	0	....	....
AN-12/Cub (USSR)	37	0	....	0	....	....
IL-18/Coot (USSR)	....	....	....	1	....	....
C-130B Hercules (US, Iran)	0	8[4]	....	0	....	....
Subtotal	93	8	....	1	....	....
Light						
HS (Avro) 748 (UK, Indigenous)	26	....	....	....	....	....
C-47A Skytrain (US, UK)	62	....	....	....	....	....
DHC-4 Caribou (Canada)	14	....	....	....	....	....
IL-14/Crate (USSR)	18	....	....	9	....	....
F-27 (Netherlands)	....	1	....	....	....	....
AN-24/Coke (USSR)	....	....	1	....	....	....
AN-26/Curl (USSR)	....	....	2	....	....	....
Mystere 20/Falcon (France)	....	1	....	....	....	....
Yak-12/Creek (USSR)	....	....	....	18	....	..
Convair 440 (US)	....	....	....	....	....	1
DH 114/Heron (Canada)	....	....	....	....	....	4
Short Skyvan Srs 3 (UK)	....	....	....	....	2	....
AN-2/Colt (USSR)	....	....	....	8	....	....
Subtotal	120	2	3	35	2	5
Total	213	10	3	36	2	5
Helicopters-Transport						
MI-4/Hound (USSR)	80	....	....	14	....	....
MI-8/Hip (USSR)	31	9	4	13	....	....
HH-43B (US)	....	6	....	....	....	....
Subtotal	111	15	4	27	....	0
Helicopters-Utility						
Alouette III	87(France)	30(France, 1 Saudi Arabia)	....	....	1	....
Alouette II (France)	0	2	0	...	....	....
OH-13H (US)	8	...	....	....	....	6
OH-13S (US)	....	12	....	....	....	....
Sikorsky S-55 (US)	....	6	....	....	....	....
UH-19D (US)	....	2	....	....	....	....
Westland Wessex (UK)	....	....	2	....	....	....
MI-1/Hare (USSR)	....	....	....	1	....	....
KA-26/Hoodlum (USSR)	....	....	....	....	....	2
Bell 206A Jet Ranger (US)	....	....	....	....	....	7
SA-315/Cheetah (Indigenous)	12	....	....	....	....	....
Subtotal	107	52	3	1	1	15
Total	218	67	7	28	1	15
Trainers	243	85	1	32	0	13
Utility	80	60	5	0	0	15
Total Inventory	1,399	511	43	267	3	53

[1] *Includes both MIG-21M (Fishbed J) and MIG-21 FL aircraft.*
[2] *In storage.*
[3] *80 of which are combat-ready.*
[4] *Includes two C-130s on short-term loan from Saudi Arabia.*

Table 1 (Continued)

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES [1]

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Afghanistan	Nepal	Sri Lanka
NAVY						
Personnel	33,000	9,900	450 [1]	....	....	2,600
Ships						
Carriers	1	0	0	....	....	0
Cruisers	2 [2]	1 [3]	0	....	....	0
Destroyers	2	4	0	....	....	0
Destroyer Escorts	17 [4]	2	0	....	....	1
Submarines	6	3 [5]	0	....	....	0
Missile Patrol	8	0	0	....	....	0
Other Coastal Patrol	17	17	5	....	....	28
Aircraft	90	0	0	....	....	0

[1] *Estimated strength.*
[2] *WW II vintage, one used as training ship.*
[3] *WW II vintage.*
[4] *Includes 1 Leander-class DEH and 9 Petyas.*
[5] *Not included are 6 SX's.*

Table 2

FORCES ON INDO-PAKISTANI BORDER (estimated)

	India		Pakistan	
Ground	Current	M+15 days	Current	M+15 days
Combat-effective personnel				
Army	261,000	405,000	224,000	253,000
Paramilitary				
Border Security Force	34,000	34,000	....	....
Central Reserve Force	3,000	8,000	....	....
Civilian Armed Forces	....	....	8,000	20,000
Total	298,000	447,000	232,000	273,000
Units				
Army				
Corps Hqs	4	5	5	5
Divisions				
Infantry	10	+14	11	13
Mountain	0	2	0	0
Armored	1	2	2	2
Independent Brigades				
Armored	5	5	1[1]	1
Artillery	2	3	5	5
Infantry	1	2	3	3
Sp Svc Gp (Bde) (Abn)	0	0	1	1
Parachute	0	1	0	0
Air Defense	2	4	2	2
Paramilitary (Bns)				
Border Security Force	36	36	....	....
Central Reserve Police	4	10	....	....
Civilian Armed Forces	....	....	10	25
Aircraft				

Current deployment of aircraft in both India and Pakistan (see OB map) precludes the necessity to transfer combat units to the border areas.

[1] *In addition, each army corps headquarters has one armored reconnaissance regiment (battalion equivalent) assigned to it.*

Table 3

INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR LOSSES, 1971

	India	Pakistan
Personnel:		
KIA	3,691	5,000 (est.)
WIA	8,650[1]	11,000 (est.)
MIA	275	1,000 (est.)
Total	12,616	17,000
Equipment:		
Tanks[2]	125	187
Naval Ships	1	6
Aircraft[3]	71	43
Canberra B(I)58	10	....
SU-7/Fitter	20	....
Hawker Hunter F-56	20	....
MIG-21/Fishbed	5	....
Gnat I	5	....
Mystere IV A	5	....
HF-24 Marut	5	....
Breguet 1050 Alize	1	....
Total	71	....
F-86F	....	20
Sabre Mk-6 (F-86)	....	4
Canberra B-57B	....	4
F-104A	....	3
MIG-19/Farmer D	....	7
T-33A	....	2
UH-19D	....	2
Beech Queen (U8F)	....	1
Total[4]	....	43

[1] *Approximately 1,100 personnel received disabling wounds.*

[2] *Some tanks listed as "losses" were subsequently returned to service after repair at depots.*

[3] *Air-to-air combat operations were relatively few during the 1971 conflict, and most aircraft losses on both sides resulted from ground fire.*

[4] *Includes an estimated eight F-86F and one T-33 captured and now in the Bangladesh air force.*

Table 4

MILITARY ADVISERS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (ESTIMATED)

Country	Army	Navy	Air Force	All Services
Pakistanis in:				
Abu Dhabi	40	14	130	....
Oman	110	92	....	....
Kuwait	....	....	200	....
Saudi Arabia	110	14	400	....
Iraq	....	....	5	....
Jordan	2	....	....	....
Syria	....	....	26	....
Libya	NA	15	245	....
Maldives	....	1	....	....
Nigeria	3	....	....	....
Iran	....	....	70	....
Qatar	1	....	....	....
Totals	266	136	1,076	1,478
Indians in:				
Bhutan [1]	3,400	....	....	....
Bangladesh [2]	NA	NA	NA	....
Nigeria	12	6	....	....
Iraq	....	....	30	....
Afghanistan	3	....	30	....
Totals	3,415	6	60	3,481

[1] *Does not include several thousand personnel with the Border Roads Organization.*

[2] *Approximately 40 Indian military personnel serve as advisers in Bangladesh; breakdown by service is unavailable.*

India

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

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Map 1

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

Secret
No Foreign Dissem

Map 2

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

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

Map 4

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Map 5

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June 1, 1974



Map 6

Pakistan

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

Map 7

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

Map 8

Map 9

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Map 10

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

Map 11

Bangladesh

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



Map 12

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

Map 13

Afghanistan

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

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Map 14



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Map 15

Nepal

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

Map 16

563665 7-74 CIA

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

Map 17

Sri Lanka

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



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Map 18

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

Map 19

III. MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Military expenditures in most of South Asia have grown substantially over the past ten years and are absorbing a larger share of domestic economic resources. India accounts for over 80 percent of the area's total military expenditures for FY 1974, while Pakistan spent almost 15 percent of the 1974 area total. These two countries and Afghanistan each allocate 20 percent or more of their respective national budgets to the defense establishment.

In most South Asian countries, boosts in military spending reflect increased personnel strengths, qualitative upgrading of weapons systems, increases in equipment inventories and maintenance requirements, expansion of domestic military production, and rising costs for military items at home and abroad. The expenditures are given in "current" prices and cannot be adjusted satisfactorily to reflect the impact of inflation. The available price information indicates, however, that most of the increase in military spending in South Asia over the past ten years reflects a real growth in military strength.

A. India

Indian defense expenditures rose sharply following the Chinese border incursions in 1962, increased more slowly through 1971, and then rose abruptly in 1972. This second heavy buildup followed the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in March 1971, and continued through the December war with Pakistan. Defense spending for 1972 was more than $2 billion, exceeding the previous year's spending by 25 percent and the original budget by 22 percent. India's defense spending increased in 1973 and 1974 as the country continued to maintain and modernize its armed forces. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1975, New Delhi is projecting a defense-spending figure of $2.7 billion, an increase of 9 percent over the revised estimate for the previous year.

The new budget reveals no dramatic shift in the allocation of funds among military services. The proportion of GNP spent on defense—only about 4 percent annually over the past decade—is relatively small in comparison with that of some other countries. The actual amount, however, represents about 23 percent of the total annual budget and absorbs between one quarter and one third of tax revenues each year.

Imports of finished military equipment, industrial raw materials, components, machinery, and technical services are estimated to have totaled $525 million in FY 1974, compared with an estimated $515 million in FY 1973. India has financed a large share of its military imports on long-term aid credits, thus minimizing the impact on immediate foreign exchange outlays. Foreign exchange outflows are estimated at $535 million in FY 1973, over 20 percent of export earnings. The ratio probably remained within the same range in FY 1974. In recent years these foreign exchange outflows generally have exceeded the value of military imports, because debt repayments for past military aid have been larger than the value of aid-financed deliveries. More than half of India's military aid repayments go to Moscow. Because New Delhi's repayments to the USSR and Eastern Europe are in rupees, which subsequently are utilized to obtain Indian commodities, there is no direct hard-currency drain.

B. Pakistan

Before the 1965 war with India, US grant military aid—about $700 million—was the major source of Pakistan's arms acquisitions. In 1966, when Pakistan had to finance the war and the postwar arms re-equipment without US military assistance, defense spending more than doubled. Military spending then declined for a few years, but by 1971 it exceeded the 1966 level.

As a result of the civil war in 1971 in its former East Wing and the war with India that December, actual defense spending increased substantially over the previous year. Much of this rise reflected construction of defenses, repairs to war-damaged defense property, increased salaries and other personnel expenditures, and increased demands on the civilian sector to supply items such as fuels and transportation. Imports were limited by foreign arms embargoes, the brief Indian blockade of Karachi harbor, and the inability of foreign suppliers to complete deliveries of new orders by June 30, 1972.

Pakistan's defense spending in 1973 was 19 percent higher than in the previous year. This rise reflected little change in real terms, however, because most of the increase was used to cover the higher cost of military imports following the rupee devaluation in May 1972 and the increase in local costs resulting from domestic inflation.

There is no indication that Pakistan intends to reduce the size of its armed forces or its military spending abroad soon. Defense expenditures for 1974 are estimated at $428 million, a programmed reduction of about $20 million from the previous year, but still a major part of Pakistan's budget.

C. Bangladesh

The outlay for the defense establishment, as proclaimed by government authorities, has not been a major portion of total government expenditures. For example, the announced military budget for 1974 is about 5 percent of total outlays. The dollar value of military expenditures for 1974 is estimated to be about $59 million, almost 90 percent greater than the revised figure for the previous year. Although estimates of GNP are sketchy, it is believed that military outlays represent about 1 percent.

D. Afghanistan

Official information on the Afghan military budgets for 1973 and 1974 is not available. The estimated dollar value of the 1974 military budget is $45 million, an increase of more than 20 percent over the estimated 1973 figures. The 1973 and 1974 figures represent 20 percent of the total national budget and about 3 percent of the estimated GNP. For the past ten years, the military establishment has been absorbing a major portion—from 18 to 24 percent—of the country's total budget.

E. Nepal

Largely dependent upon neighboring India for military support, Nepal's military outlays have been relatively small over the past ten years. Although the value of the military budget has more than doubled—from about $3 million in 1965 to almost $8 million in 1974—defense as a share of the national budget has usually remained within the range of 7 to 9 percent. Military expenditures represent less than 1 percent of GNP.

F. Sri Lanka

Although still a relatively small percentage of Sri Lanka's total national budget, the dollar value of the military budget (excluding police) increased from about $9 million in 1965 to $24 million in 1973. The estimated military budget for 1974 represents 1 percent of GNP and reflects a slight decrease over last year's expenditures.

SECRET

Table 1

MILITARY EXPENDITURES, SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES, FY1974
(*Million US $*)

Country	Value	Percent of Total
Afghanistan	45	1.5
Bangladesh	59	1.9
India	2,501	81.6
Nepal	8	0.3
Pakistan	428	13.9
Sri Lanka	23	0.8
Total	3,064	100.0

Table 2

INDIA: GROSS DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1968–75 [1]
(*Million US $*) [2 3]

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 (Revised estimate)	1975 (Budget estimate)
Military Expenditures	1,393	1,489	1,580	1,730	2,161	2,354	2,501	2,726
Total National Government Expenditures	6,760	6,693	7,440	7,640	9,400	10,440	11,252	11,820
Percent of National Expenditures	21	22	21	23	23	23	22	23
Percent of GNP	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.6	4.2	4.3	4.3	3.9

[1] *Indian fiscal year ends March 31 of [illegible] year.*
[2] *Converted at rate of 7.5 rupees to US $1*
[3] *Gross National Product not available for 1974–75; figures for those years are estimated.*

SECRET

Table 3

INDIA: DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BY SERVICE, 1968–1975 [1]
(*Million US $*) [2]

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 (Revised estimate)	1975 (Budget estimate)
Army	1,006	1,059	1,091	1,168	1,486	1,609	1,636	1,729
Navy	64	78	99	131	153	174	223	256
Air Force	241	262	291	328	402	442	491	557
Other	82	90	98	103	120	130	151	184
Total Defense Expenditures [3]	1,393	1,489	1,580	1,730	2,161	2,354	2,501	2,726

[1] *Indian fiscal year ends March 31 of stated year.*
[2] *Converted at rate of 7.5 rupees to US $1.*
[3] *The sum of figures may not equal the total because of rounding.*

Table 4

INDIA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1968–1975 [1]

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 (Revised estimate)	1975 (Budget estimate)
Army	72.0	71.1	69.1	67.6	68.8	68.3	65.4	63.4
Navy	4.6	5.2	6.3	7.6	7.1	7.4	8.9	9.4
Air Force	17.3	17.6	18.4	18.9	18.6	18.8	19.6	20.4
Other	5.9	6.0	6.2	5.9	5.6	5.5	6.1	6.7
Total Defense Expenditures [2]	100.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] *Indian fiscal year ends March 31 of stated year.*
[2] *The sum of percentages may not add to 100.0 because of rounding.*

Table 5

INDIA: FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1968–1975 [1]
(*Million US $*)[2]

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 (Revised estimate)	1975 (Budget estimate)
Pay and Allowances	335	377	393	426	469	509	512	518
Army	277	309	321	354	381	412	411	415
Navy	13	15	16	19	20	21	22	23
Air Force	45	53	56	64	68	75	78	79
Procurement	601	630	651	695	1,040	1,113	1,136	1,233
Army	474	488	478	489	753	807	781	828
Navy	16	13	16	22	44	40	61	76
Air Force	112	134	157	183	244	266	294	330
Capital Investment	149	155	182	199	239	284	273	316
Army	58	55	69	80	94	114	77	78
Navy	13	24	38	54	60	81	91	110
Air Force	32	26	24	23	33	35	36	46
Other	46	50	52	42	52	55	68	82
Operation and Maintenance	309	326	353	400	413	448	581	659
Army	232	251	268	303	323	347	444	493
Navy	24	27	31	37	30	33	51	49
Air Force	53	49	54	60	59	68	86	105
Other	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	0	0	12
Total Defense Expenditures[3]	1,393	1,489	1,580	1,730	2,161	2,354	2,501	2,726

[1] *Indian fiscal year ends March 31 of stated year.*
[2] *Converted at rate of 7.5 rupees to US $1.*
[3] *The sum of figures may not equal total because of rounding.*

NOTE: The pay and allowance category is for active duty military personnel only. Expenditures on manufacturing and research and on stores comprise procurement. Capital investment is a cost estimate or budget authorization of projects which increase the assets of the military establishment. The Operation and Maintenance category includes pay and allowance of reservists, auxiliary forces, territorial forces and civilians; transportation; expenditures on works chargeable to revenue, maintenance charges in the UK; special projects; and pensions.

Table 6

INDIA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1968–1975 [1]

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 (Revised estimate)	1975 (Budget estimate)
Pay and Allowances	24.0	20.8	24.9	25.2	21.7	21.6	20.5	19.0
Army	82.8	81.9	81.6	81.2	81.1	81.1	80.4	80.2
Navy	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.5
Air Force	13.4	14.1	14.4	14.7	14.6	14.7	15.2	15.3
Procurement	43.2	42.4	41.2	40.2	48.1	47.3	45.4	45.2
Army	78.7	76.5	73.4	70.5	72.4	72.5	68.7	67.1
Navy	2.7	2.2	2.5	3.2	4.2	3.6	5.4	6.1
Air Force	18.6	21.3	24.3	26.4	23.4	23.9	25.8	26.7
Capital Investment	10.6	10.4	11.6	11.5	11.1	12.1	10.9	11.6
Army	38.9	35.9	37.4	40.3	39.3	39.9	28.5	24.7
Navy	8.6	15.9	20.5	26.9	25.0	28.6	33.2	25.1
Air Force	21.6	17.2	12.9	11.3	13.8	12.4	13.3	14.5
Other	30.9	31.7	28.7	21.5	21.9	19.2	25.0	26.0
Operation and Maintenance	22.1	21.9	22.4	23.1	19.1	19.0	23.2	24.2
Army	75.1	77.1	76.1	75.7	78.3	77.6	76.3	74.8
Navy	8.0	8.2	8.8	9.3	7.2	7.4	8.8	7.4
Air Force	17.0	15.1	15.4	14.9	14.5	15.2	14.9	16.0
Other	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	0.0	0.0	1.8
Total Defense Expenditures [2]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] *Indian fiscal year ends March 31 of stated year.*

[2] *The sum of percentages may not add to 100.0 because of rounding.*

Table 7

PAKISTAN: MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1965–1974 [1]
(*Million US $*) [2]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Military Expenditures	127	288	232	221	245	278	323	376	448	428
Total National Government Expenditures	548	745	898	879	993	1,234	1,140	1,176	1,368	1,578
Percent of National Budget [3]	23	39	26	25	25	23	29	32	33	27
Percent of GNP	3	5	4	4	4	4	4	8	8	7

[1] *Fiscal year ends June 30 of stated year; 1972–1974 is for West Pakistan only.*
[2] *Converted at 9.9 rupees to US $1.*
[3] *Includes revenue expenditures and capital disbursement.*

Table 8

BANGLADESH: MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1972–1974 [1]
(*Million US $*) [2]

	1972	1973	1974
Military Budget	17	31	59
Total National Government Expenditures	258	782	1,212
Percent of National Budget [3]	7	4	5
Percent of GNP	1	1	1

[1] *Fiscal year ends June 30 of stated year; 1972 is for a six-month period only.*
[2] *Converted at 8 taka to US $1.*
[3] *National budget includes development funds.*

Table 9

AFGHANISTAN: MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1965–1974 [1]
(*Million US $*) [2]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973 [3]	1974 [3]
Dollar Value of Military Budget	17	20	24	24	28	35	37	37	37	45
Total National Government Expenditures	93	103	119	119	139	148	153	168	186	225
Percent of National Budget	18	19	20	20	20	24	24	22	20	20
Percent of GNP [4]	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5

[1] *Fiscal year ends March 20 of stated year.*
[2] *Converted at 45 Afghanis to US $1.*
[3] *Estimates only, based on approximate proportion of national budget.*
[4] *Gross National Product data not available; percent of GNP figures are approximate.*

Table 10

NEPAL: MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1965–1974 [1]
(*Million US $*) [2]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Dollar Value of Military Budget	3	3	4	4	4	5	6	6	7	8
Total National Government Expenditures	33	41	42	44	56	68	73	84	97	146
Percent of National Budget	9	7	10	9	7	7	8	7	7	5
Percent of GNP [3]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

[1] *Fiscal year ends July 15 of stated year.*
[2] *Converted at 10.56 rupees to US $1.*
[3] *Gross National Product data not available; it is estimated that military expenditures have been maintained at no more than 1 percent of GNP.*

Table 11

SRI LANKA: MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1965–1974 [1]
(*Million US $*) [2]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 [3]
Dollar Value of Military Budget	9	10	10	11	12	14	26	24	24	23
Total National Government Expenditures	333	354	378	431	481	516	544	597	672	878
Percent of National Budget	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	4	4	3
Percent of GNP	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

[1] *Fiscal year ends September 30 for years 1965–1971; ends December 31 for years 1972–1974.*
[2] *Converted at 6.7 rupees to US $1.*
[3] *Estimated.*

IV. DOMESTIC MILITARY PRODUCTION

A. India

For more than a decade, New Delhi has tried to develop an arms industry that would enable it to be less dependent on foreign suppliers and thereby save foreign exchange. The industry's output already includes a wide range of defense equipment: small arms, artillery, tanks, several types of aircraft, frigates, and small tactical missiles. Although considerable progress has been made, particularly in the production of small arms, India still relies heavily on imports of raw materials, components, and technology for the manufacture of more sophisticated weapons systems, such as aircraft and naval ships.

Domestic military procurement now constitutes about 70 percent of total military purchases. Public and private enterprises in the civilian sector furnish about 60 percent of military supplies obtained in India, including petroleum products and foodstuffs. Ordnance factories and enterprises under the Ministry of Defense Production provide the remainder, including most military hardware.

Management and Scope

India's defense industries are managed primarily by the Department of Defense Production, which owns and operates 28 ordnance factories, a tank factory, and a freeze-dried meat factory. The government also has either majority or total ownership of eight public enterprises, which are controlled by the Department of Defense Production.

Production in these industries increased at an average annual rate of 12 percent from April 1964 to March 1971. Concomitant with India's military build-up beginning in the spring of 1971, defense production was accelerated, and output increased by 29 percent during FY 1972 (Table 1). Production is estimated to have increased to $532 million in FY 1973, but preliminary estimates indicate a drop to $523 million in FY 1974. Approximately 80 percent of production in defense facilities was for the military, with the balance for the civilian market and exports. Defense plants provide transport aircraft for India's civil airlines, small commercial ships, trucks, tractors, railroad coaches, and communications equipment.

Ground Armaments

India is self-sufficient in small arms, light artillery and antiaircraft weapons, and related ammunition. Weapons production includes rifles,

submachine guns, light machine guns, 3.5-inch rocket launchers, 57-mm. and 106-mm. recoilless rifles, 2-inch, 81-mm., and 120-mm. mortars, 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, and 75-mm. pack howitzers. A 105-mm. field gun has been developed and is scheduled to enter limited production in 1974, and to reach full production by 1976. An agreement for licensed production of the Soviet 130-mm. field gun was signed early in 1972, but production is not likely to begin soon.

India already has produced about 545 "Vijayanta" (Vickers) medium tanks with a 105-mm. gun under British license at the Avadi heavy vehicle factory. Almost 70 percent of the components are produced in India, but some major parts still must be imported. The factory also is producing armored recovery vehicles. The Ministry of Defense Production is developing an armored personnel carrier—a modified version of the Czech OT-62—as well as a 105-mm. towed gun and a 130-mm. self-propelled gun, and also is considering an indigenously designed medium tank. Trucks and jeeps for the military are built under West German and Japanese licenses.

Naval Construction

At the Mazagon docks in Bombay, India produces—under British license—Leander-class frigates equipped with antiaircraft missiles. These are the first large modern combatants constructed in the country, but the project is several years behind schedule. Of the six frigates currently under order, one has been commissioned and three are fitting out. The locally produced content was only about 50 percent for the first unit, but by the end of the program the percentage of domestically produced components is expected to be almost 80. India also has constructed inshore minesweepers, patrol boats, landing craft, and dredgers; it eventually hopes to expand production to include submarines and other large missile-equipped frigates.

Aircraft Production

Although India has been engaged in production of military aircraft for over a decade, the industry still relies extensively on imported raw materials and components and on the use of foreign production licenses. To utilize domestic sources to the fullest, the Indians are attempting to substitute components manufactured indigenously for foreign-built ones.

The difficulties in such substitution include the lack of suitable raw materials—steel alloys—and the stringent manufacturing specifications of most aircraft components. In addition, the unit cost of producing many

aircraft parts domestically would be high because of the limited quantities required. Some items involving essentially unsophisticated technology—such as tires, hydraulic seals, filters, electrical components, electrical cable, and batteries—have been successfully developed by the Indians for their aircraft industry. They also have been able to produce some aluminum alloy sheets. These efforts have increased the domestic content, by value, of the various aircraft under production. They have not, however, created a great degree of Indian self-sufficiency.

A plant for the manufacture of accessories for the aircraft industry is under construction at Lucknow, and New Delhi hopes that this will result in a significant reduction of foreign-produced items in the manufacture of some aircraft. The plant is scheduled to produce items such as wheels and brake systems, undercarriages, powered flying controls, fuel, hydraulic, and instrument systems, and aircraft ejection seats—all under license from several British firms and the Soviet Union. Initially, all components will have to be imported, but the Indians plan eventually to substitute locally manufactured components.

Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd., which is responsible for virtually all manufacture of aircraft in India, produces six types of military aircraft, with major assistance from various countries. The Soviet MIG-21, the British Gnat, the British HS-748 light transport, and the French Alouette III light helicopter are produced under license. The domestically designed HF-24 jet fighter and HJT-16 jet trainer also are in production.

Production of the Soviet MIG-21 jet fighter is likely to continue through much of the 1970s, as Moscow has agreed to license follow-on production of the improved MIG-21M to replace the MIG-21FL. The scheduled production of 196 MIG-21FLs was completed in early 1974, and production of the improved version was expected to begin later in 1974. The first MIG-21M assembled in India was completed in early 1973. Final assembly and production of airframes for the MIG-21 take place at Nasik (Table 2), engines are produced at Koraput, and avionics at Hyderabad.

More than 200 subsonic Gnat jet fighters have been built at the Bangalore division of Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. Plans originally called for production of 235 Gnats, but the program, employing an improved version, was extended as a result of the fighter's excellent performance in the 1971 conflict with Pakistan.

The HF-24 jet fighter program, set up to provide India with an indigenous Mach 2 interceptor, has not been very successful. The key problem has

been matching the aircraft to a suitable engine. The current Mach 1 version, with a British engine, had some success in a ground-attack role, and an improved version and a trainer model are under development. Production is likely to continue well into the 1970s, and more than 150 Mach 1 aircraft may be built.

India plans to produce a new generation supersonic fighter in the next decade as a follow-on to the HF-24 program. The shortcomings of the HF-24 suggest, however, that the program is likely to encounter difficulties, particularly in engine development. India will require considerable foreign assistance to ensure success of the project.

It is uncertain whether production of the HS-748 medium transport for the military will continue beyond the mid-1970s. Some 45 have been ordered by the air force, but there now seems to be less interest in development of freighter, airdrop, and maritime reconnaissance versions, probably in part because of the aircraft's poor performance characteristics. The HJT-16 jet trainer is likely to continue in production into the late 1970s. More than 100 of this aircraft have already been ordered.

The Alouette III helicopter production program was to end by late 1974 after some 145 aircraft had been built, but it has been extended to 1977. Licensed production of the SA-315 for use as an observation helicopter began in mid-1973. As many as 140 are scheduled to be built. The Indians hope to develop their own helicopter by the end of the decade.

Missile Production

In July 1971, Bharat Dynamics, Ltd. began production, under license, of the French SS-11 anti-tank missile. India also has options to produce other types of French missiles. Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd., manufactures the Soviet K-13 Atoll air-to-air missile for the MIG-21.

A project was begun in 1972 to produce surface-to-air missiles based on the Soviet SA-2 design. Production is probably years away, because the Indians are attempting to manufacture most of the components themselves. Development work also is under way on a launch vehicle for the country's space program, but the project is not likely to have any military application until at least the 1980s.

Assessment

India has developed a significant industrial base for military production and, except for Israel, which it rivals, has the largest defense output of any

developing country in the non-communist world. But it has not yet achieved overall self-sufficiency, nor has it reduced annual outlays of foreign exchange for military items. India's requirements for substantial quantities of sophisticated weaponry and support equipment necessitate large-scale procurement of finished defense stores from abroad. During the past few years, imports of finished military equipment from foreign suppliers accounted for about one fourth of total defense procurement. This proportion increased to about 30 percent during the buildup in 1972. The total value of such imports was almost $350 million in 1973,* while domestic procurement** totaled about $880 million. Domestic production does save some foreign exchange, but such savings have been minimal.

India has relied on foreign collaboration to build its defense industries, and most military equipment is still produced under foreign license agreements. The UK and several West European countries supply most of this assistance. The Soviet role in domestic arms production has increased but remains comparatively small in relation to total output. In contrast, the USSR and Eastern Europe are the principal suppliers of finished military equipment to India.

New Delhi plans to limit further foreign participation in the manufacture of military equipment. In 1973, the government reaffirmed its policy of not entering into new foreign license agreements for production of military commodities. Existing licensing agreements will not be renewed automatically, and all defense plants have been instructed to develop indigenous versions of equipment now produced under license. These measures, however, probably will have little immediate impact on foreign-exchange outlays. In fact, they add to the cost of India's military program and will delay the

**Derived from outlays of the Defense Ministry as contained in the armed forces budget. Only a portion of these total direct imports can be accounted for by known deliveries under military arms agreements detailed in this handbook, indicating that a substantial amount of unidentified ammunition, vehicles, spare parts, and other finished military equipment is entering India each year.*

***From ordnance factories and public and private enterprises, which supply finished military hardware items, petroleum products, and other goods such as medical and veterinary stores, food, and clothing.*

introduction of new weapons systems. Furthermore, although New Delhi will endeavor to design and produce military equipment domestically, it will still depend considerably on foreign technology.

The arms industry has failed on many occasions to meet production targets. The main constraints have been the unreliable conditions of plant and machinery, the failure of Indian industry to provide necessary components and raw materials, and the delays in the receipt of imports, caused in part by the failure to place orders on time. Output has lagged, particularly in the production of major weapons such as tanks and MIG-21 jet fighters. India did manage to step up production of small arms, mortars, and ammunition during the 1971 buildup against Pakistan. The Ministry of Defense Production is engaged in civilian production and military exports to use excess plant capacity and increase government earnings.

B. Pakistan

Domestic military production will continue for some time to account for only a minor share of total Pakistani acquisitions. Islamabad is not self-sufficient in any major category of arms production. Pakistan produces only a portion of its small-arms and ammunition requirements; production of more sophisticated weapons is limited and requires a large percentage of imported components.

Most domestic defense production takes place at the Wah ordnance facilities, which manufacture G-3 rifles of West German design, Cobra wire-guided anti-tank missiles and other anti-tank weapons, small arms, mortar, and artillery ammunition, air force ordnance, and spare parts for Chinese-supplied tanks. Islamabad suffered a setback in its domestic program when it lost to Bangladesh an ordnance plant near Dacca that produced the Type-56 rifle, a Chinese version of the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle, and ammunition for a variety of Communist small arms. The types and quantities of ammunition produced domestically will increase with the eventual completion of four new ordnance facilities under construction.

Islamabad plans to assemble Chinese T-59 medium tanks and eventually manufacture them under license at the Taxila Heavy Mechanical Complex, which was built in the 1960s with Chinese economic aid and is now being expanded. Pakistan expects to produce about 50 tanks annually. Problems reportedly have arisen in the domestic fabrication of some components. Moreover, full-scale indigenous tank production is tied to the completion—possibly in 1976—of the heavy forge and foundry at Taxila, which is under construction.

Pakistan is exploring the possibility of producing its own aircraft. China has agreed to study the feasibility of establishing repair and overhaul

facilities for the MIG-19 jet fighter in Pakistan. The Chinese also are evaluating the feasibility of producing aircraft spare parts in Pakistan. Islamabad has been negotiating with France since at least mid-1973 to acquire facilities for the assembly and eventual production of Mirage jet fighters. The Pakistanis are assembling Alouette III helicopters under a 1970 licensing agreement with the French.

Islamabad is also seeking to produce missiles and submarines indigenously. Negotiations with France have been under way since late 1973 to acquire licenses for production of this equipment.

C. Bangladesh

The only ordnance facility in Bangladesh is a rifle factory and small-arms ammunition plant near Dacca, built in the late 1960s with Chinese assistance. The facility was opened in 1970 and was operated by the Pakistani army through much of 1971, with production dependent on imports of raw material from West Pakistan and foreign countries. The Pakistani army may have removed or destroyed much of the equipment in December 1971, but it is now believed to be operational. The only military production of any consequence is the construction of small patrol boats for the Bangladesh navy.

D. Afghanistan

Afghanistan has only a minimal capacity for production of small arms and explosives and is almost entirely dependent on imported weapons and military equipment. Its sole arms factory is located in Kabul.

E. Nepal

Nepal produces small-arms ammunition at the Sundarijhel ammunition factory in Kathmandu. The country depends primarily on India, the UK, and the US for military items, but it has also obtained limited quantities of equipment from the USSR and China.

F. Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka produces only a few quartermaster items, and must rely exclusively on foreign suppliers for arms and equipment.

Table 1

INDIA: DEFENSE PRODUCTION, 1969-1974[1]
(Million US$)[2]

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973[3]	1974[4]
Arms, Ammunition, and Vehicles	123.1	118.1	124.8	191.4	204.1	149.0
Clothing and General Stores	29.6	26.7	24.9	45.3	52.7	48.0
Ordnance Factories	**152.7**	**144.8**	**149.7**	**236.7**	**256.8**	**197.0**
Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd.[5]	71.9	102.9	98.7	92.5	105.2	NA
Bharat Electronics, Ltd.[6]	27.6	32.2	39.2	43.7	52.2	NA
Mazagon Dock, Ltd.[7]	14.3	18.3	21.8	28.2	38.5	39.4
Garden Reach Workshops, Ltd.[8]	9.0	11.5	20.0	22.6	22.2	NA
Praga Tools, Ltd.[9]	2.3	2.5	3.5	3.2	3.1	NA
Bharat Earth Movers, Ltd.[10]	22.3	26.6	30.1	38.0	49.4	NA
Goa Shipyard, Ltd.[11]	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.7
Bharat Dynamics, Ltd.[12]	--	--	--	1.4	2.9	6.0
Public Sector Undertakings	**148.4**	**195.0**	**214.6**	**231.2**	**275.3**	**326.0**
TOTAL PRODUCTION	**301.1**	**339.8**	**364.3**	**467.9**	**532.1**	**523.0**

1. *Fiscal year ends March 31 of stated year.*

2. *Converted at 7.5 rupees to US$1.*

3. *Provisional.*

4. *Estimated.*

5. *Incorporated as a public enterprise in October 1964, combining the various Indian aircraft companies. almost all production—including air-to-air missiles and radar—is for the military.*

6. *Manufactures various sophisicated and specialized transmitters, receivers, trans-receivers, and radars for both military and civilian use; also transmitting and X-ray tubes, crystals, ceramic and mica capacitors, and radio and TV receiving valves and transistors. An additional factory is being established, primarily to meet defense needs.*

7. *Performs ship repair and construction (including harbor craft, minesweepers, dredges, and frigates).*

8. *Designs and constructs shallow-draft vessels, including tugs, light naval craft, river steamers, flags, water boats, barges, pontoons, etc.; also, repairs sea-going, harbor, and inland craft. The company has begun production of diesel engines.*

9. *Produces drilling machines, tools and cutter grinders, surface grinders, milling machines, and machine tool accessories such as chucks, railroad screw couplings, crankshafts, and other diesel engine parts.*

10. *Became a public enterprise in May 1964 and produces heavy earth-moving equipment, crawler tractors, and railroad coaches.*

11. *Originally Portuguese-owned, it became a public enterprise in October 1967. The yard constructs and repairs barges and other small craft.*

12. *Began production of SS-11 antitank missiles in mid-1971.*

Table 2

INDIA: AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION

Type	Hindustan Aeronautics Division	Current Production Order	Total Output Estimates Through June 1974	Current Annual Rate[1/]
MIG-21FL	Nasik	196[2/]	196	
MIG-21M	Nasik	150[3/]		
HF-24	Bangalore	129[4/]	102	15
Gnat	Bangalore	235[5/]	225	12
HS-748	Kanpur	69[6/]	58	12
HJT-16	Bangalore	115	54	12
Alouette III	Bangalore	174	129	15
SA-315	Bangalore	45[7/]	13	15

1/ Based on aircraft completed during the first six months of 1974.

2/ Program completed in early 1974.

3/ Follow-on to MIG-21FL; production was slated to begin in April 1974.

4/ An order has been placed for 41 trainer aircraft now under development.

5/ Program scheduled for completion in 1974; production of 106 improved versions is expected to start in mid-1975.

6/ Includes 24 ordered by Indian Airlines for commercial use; the future of the program is uncertain.

7/ An order for an additional 100 is expected to be placed.

V. FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY

The countries of the subcontinent have imported more than $4 billion worth of military equipment since 1954. Over half has been delivered since the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. India has received some 58 percent; Pakistan about 41 percent, and Bangladesh 1 percent.

The pattern of arms flow to the area shifted sharply after 1965 as a result of a US-UK arms embargo designed to halt the war. The loss of these traditional suppliers compelled India and Pakistan to turn elsewhere. New Delhi found the USSR a willing source capable of meeting many of its requirements. India also rapidly expanded its own manufacture of arms and now fills more than half of its requirements from domestic production.

China supplies a large part of Islamabad's requirements but has not made available the range of sophisticated weaponry that the USSR is exporting to India. Pakistan is buying some modern weapons systems from France, but they are expensive and negotiations are slow. Presently, Pakistan's facilities for producing military equipment are limited.

A. India

The Changing Pattern: Indian procurement of large quantities of Western and Communist weapons over the past two decades was spurred by the continued tension with Pakistan and China that periodically erupted into hostilities. Between early 1954 and 1973, India imported more than $2.4 billion worth of arms through foreign military aid programs and cash purchases (Table 1). The USSR has provided more than half the total, and since 1965 has supplied nearly three quarters of India's weapons imports.

Prior to 1966, the USSR, the UK, the US, and France were India's primary foreign sources of military equipment. Following the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965, the UK and the US suspended major arms deliveries to the subcontinent. Although both countries later resumed arms shipments, US deliveries from 1966 through 1973 totaled only $35 million* in equipment, spare parts, and ammunition. UK deliveries subsequently were resumed at about their annual prewar level; from 1966 through 1973, they totaled an estimated $260 million and included jet fighters and the Tigercat surface-to-air missile system, with an option on three more. New Delhi recently has ordered three Sea King ASW helicopters, support equipment, and spare parts. In addition, India is constructing Leander-class frigates,

**The value of US deliveries includes commercial sales.*

medium tanks, the Gnat fighter aircraft, and transport aircraft under British licenses, necessitating imports of machinery, raw materials, and components.

Although it has received only $42 million worth of arms from France since 1965, India considers Paris a future source of fighters and other equipment. New Delhi also is producing Alouette III and SA-315 helicopters and SS-11 antitank missiles under French license. Other Western countries have delivered at least $41 million worth of equipment since 1965, mostly ordnance and support equipment but also ten Canberra jet light bombers.

Most of the procurement from the West since 1965 has involved hard-currency outlays rather than grants. European suppliers, particularly the UK, usually have extended five-year credits at interest rates ranging from 4 to 6 percent. India's purchases of Western machinery and equipment for its arms industry have generally been financed through commercial credits or paid for on current account. India also has had to pay licensing fees and royalties estimated at 5 percent of the value of each item produced.

Moscow's Dominant Role: Perhaps the most important consequence of the US-UK embargo on arms deliveries was India's shifting to the Soviet Union for its arms. India already was obtaining a significant amount of military equipment from the USSR, but after 1965 only Moscow was willing to continue to provide large quantities of sophisticated equipment on attractive terms. Since then, the USSR has become India's sole source of high-performance jet aircraft, submarines, and guided-missile patrol boats.

Since November 1960, Moscow has delivered about $1.4 billion worth of military aid to India (Table 2). Soviet deliveries have averaged over $140 million annually since 1965. Most Indian arms purchases from the Soviet Union require a 10-percent down payment on delivery, with the balance covered by ten-year credits at 2-percent interest. Repayments are in non-convertible Indian rupees rather than in the hard currency generally required by Western countries.

More than half of the value of Soviet deliveries to India has been in aircraft and related production facilities. New Delhi initially purchased a small number of transport aircraft in 1960. By December 1973, the Soviets had delivered almost 350 jet fighters and trainers,* 85 transport aircraft, and about 150 helicopters. A contract for four squadrons of MIG-21M jet fighters worth $65 million was signed in July 1972 to replace losses sustained in the war with Pakistan. India, during 1972, received its first MI-8 helicopters—33 were ordered in 1971 and 1972—and deliveries of additional MI-8s have begun under a new contract.

**Excluding about 200 MIG-21 aircraft assembled and produced domestically.*

India in 1963 signed an agreement to purchase several battalions of the Soviet SA-2 missile system. Since then, it has obtained at least $90 million worth of SA-2 equipment. In 1970 the Indians started to fabricate their own spare parts for the SA-2 system and in 1972 began developing a domestic variant of this system. A contract for the purchase of the SA-3 system was signed in August 1973, but New Delhi later expressed a strong preference for the SA-6 after its effective use by the Arabs during the Middle East hostilities. Moscow reportedly agreed, probably during Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973, to supply the SA-6 and also to consider an Indian request for the SA-7.

Soviet military deliveries to the Indian army have been confined primarily to tanks and artillery. Moscow has provided 410 T-55 medium and 176 light amphibious tanks, and almost 600 130-mm. and 100-mm. field guns. The USSR also is supplying multiple-rocket launchers and radar-controlled, self-propelled ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns. Much of the $140 million worth of new military assistance agreed to in the second half of 1973 consists of additional ground forces equipment.

India's determination to establish a larger presence in the Indian Ocean has resulted in increased purchases of naval equipment, for which Moscow is the primary source. The USSR has supplied nine Petya-class escorts, six F-class submarines, eight Osa-class guided-missile boats, a submarine tender and rescue ship, and several smaller units. Eight additional Osas, two submarines, and a Petya have been purchased but not yet delivered. Except for the probable supply of minesweepers, however, Moscow has not been forthcoming on India's priority naval needs, such as guided-missile destroyers, ASW aircraft, and V/STOL aircraft.

Moscow also has provided over $200 million in plants, machinery, and raw materials to help expand India's arms industry. The bulk has been used to develop facilities to produce MIG-21 jet fighters and Atoll air-to-air missiles and to build naval facilities at Vishakhapatnam. In addition, India produces some ammunition and a wide range of spare parts under Soviet license.

The USSR has provided a substantial amount of technical assistance to supplement its arms-supply program. Almost 1,700 Indian military personnel, mostly from the navy and air force, have undergone training in the USSR since 1961. An estimated 300 Soviet military technicians were in India during 1973. Soviet military technicians generally are employed to

assemble Soviet equipment shipped to India and to train Indian personnel in its use and maintenance. In recent years, New Delhi has required that most of the training be conducted in India so as to reduce the cost of sending personnel to the USSR, which was estimated to have been more than $1 million annually during the late 1960s.

East European bloc countries have delivered about $130 million worth of military equipment to India since 1965. Czechoslovakia has supplied about two thirds, mostly tanks and APCs. Prague will send 100 additional APCs under an agreement signed in 1973. Bulgaria has supplied some $12 million worth of ammunition and explosives. Poland delivered T-55 tanks and is building four Polnocny-class medium landing ships for India.

Modernization Plans: India's projected defense requirements are aimed at a rapid improvement in weapons technology, a goal which is likely to perpetuate its dependence on foreign suppliers. The USSR probably will remain India's major foreign source of sophisticated arms through the 1970s; the West has proven to be an unreliable source in time of crisis and has not offered repayment terms as liberal as the Soviets. The British probably will provide primarily spare parts and replacements for equipment already in Indian inventories as well as furnish technical assistance and some components under expanding licensed-production programs.

Indian plans for the late 1970s call for replacement of many of their jet fighters with more sophisticated models. Difficulties with domestic aircraft-development programs will necessitate continued sizable imports of foreign aircraft. New Delhi has shown interest only in replacement aircraft of Western origin, despite Soviet offers of both the MIG-23 and the SU-20.

India has considered importing substantial numbers of jet bombers in order to expand and modernize its bomber inventory by the late 1970s. Should they be unable to acquire bombers in the West, the Indians might accept a Soviet offer of either the TU-16 or TU-22 jet medium bomber, which until now has been rejected. New Delhi has felt that the TU-16 was not a significant improvement over the Canberras that now make up the Indian bomber force. India was also dissatisfied with the electronics package offered on the TU-22.

The Indians appear to be placing increasing emphasis on modernization of their naval force. During the 1970s, domestic production will satisfy only a portion of naval requirements, and the navy will have to rely on foreign acquisitions. India plans to continue construction of coastal minesweepers,

patrol boats, frigates, and various auxiliary vessels, and it hopes to undertake production of submarines and coastal patrol corvettes.

B. Pakistan

The Changing Pattern: Pakistan's foreign military acquisitions from 1954 through 1973 totaled more than $1.7 billion (Table 3). Pakistan joined the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact (subsequently renamed the Central Treaty Organization—CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the mid-1950s,* and received almost all of its arms and training from the US and the UK until 1966. When the US and UK restricted arms shipments, Islamabad turned to other sources to replace the equipment lost during the Indo-Pakistani war of September 1965. Since then, the People's Republic of China has supplied some 37 percent of Pakistan's equipment imports and France about 30 percent.

Traditional Suppliers: The US has delivered more than $70 million** of materiel since 1965, mostly nonlethal equipment—trucks, spare parts, communications and electronic equipment—and some ammunition. These have been cash transactions.

The US temporarily lifted its restrictions in 1970, whereupon Pakistan purchased 300 armored personnel carriers valued at $13 million, plus support equipment and spare parts worth $1 million. Deliveries were scheduled to begin in 1972 but the agreement was suspended in March 1971, when the civil war broke out in East Pakistan.

Pakistan again sought to procure the 300 APCs early in 1972 and also pressed the US to lift its restrictions on the sale of aircraft, artillery, and antiaircraft guns, ground-to-ground and surface-to-air missile systems, missile boats, and submarines. Islamabad specifically requested 100 M47/48 tanks, four submarines, 12 B-57 bombers, 25 F-5 fighters, and various ground-force weapons and support equipment at discount prices and on deferred repayment terms. The US agreed in March 1973 to deliver by year's end only the $14 million of equipment purchased in 1970 and to resume sales on a cash basis of nonlethal equipment and spare parts for previously supplied equipment.

Although the UK was a major arms supplier prior to the 1965 war, $10 million worth of spare parts, electronics, and ammunition has been delivered since 1965. The hiatus in major arms transactions with London lasted until 1972, when an agreement for six Sea King helicopters was signed. London has since agreed to sell two reconditioned destroyer escorts to Pakistan.

**In November 1972, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO.*

***The value of US deliveries includes commercial sales.*

Soviet and East European Programs: In the mid-1960s, the USSR signed arms contracts of $65 million with Pakistan. Moscow believed that an arms aid program might eventually undercut Chinese and Western influence and lessen Islamabad's hostility toward India. Pakistan, however, did not moderate its position toward India and continued to maintain close relations with China. Moreover, New Delhi objected to the Soviet sales to Pakistan. Moscow succumbed to Indian pressure and in mid-1969 stopped shipments after delivering only $22 million worth of equipment, including 60 medium tanks, 60 artillery pieces, 10 helicopters, ammunition, airport lighting equipment, and radar. Moscow sold some $2 million worth of military trucks to Pakistan in 1972, but it is not expected to resume shipments of lethal items.

Czechoslovakia, following the Soviet lead, resumed military sales to Pakistan in 1972 after a two-year hiatus. Prague agreed to supply $16-17 million of military vehicles and ammunition. It had previously supplied military support equipment, principally trucks, cranes bridging equipment, and spare parts, totaling $16 million.

China: Since 1965, China has emerged as Pakistan's most important foreign source of arms. Peking agreed to provide Islamabad with more than $350 million in military aid (Table 4)—about 60 percent in grants and the balance financed under long-term credits.

Discussions with the Chinese were initiated some six months prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Apparently concerned over dependence on US arms, President Ayub Khan visited China in March 1965 and presented Peking with a list of required ground-force equipment. Negotiations over this equipment dragged on through the summer, but after the outbreak of the war, China immediately agreed to provide an estimated $75 million in grant aid. This included MIG-19 jet fighters, U-MIG-15 jet trainers, IL-28 jet light bombers, aircraft ground-support materiel, and equipment for three infantry divisions and four tank regiments. Some 250 antiaircraft guns and recoilless rifles were airlifted to Pakistan at once, and deliveries of all equipment were completed before the end of 1966.

By the end of 1973, Peking had supplied Islamabad with 12 Shanghai-II class motor gunboats, 4 Huchwan-class hydrofoil motor torpedo boats,, about 160 MIG-29 jet fighters, four IL-28 jet light bombers, 850 medium tanks, over 1,300 artillery and antiaircraft guns, more than 130,000 individual and other infantry weapons, large quantities of ammunition, and support equipment. Thirty of the MIG-19s were turned over to the Pakistani

air force during the first two months of 1972 to replace fighters lost during the 1971 war. Pakistan also received minor repair facilities for the MIG-19 as grant aid and was permitted to use parts of two economic aid credits to construct an ordnance facility at Dacca (now in Bangladesh), to expand existing facilities at Wah, and to import a tank-repair workshop and a tank-production facility.

In 1973, Chinese technicians were studying the feasibility of Pakistan's manufacturing spare parts for the MIG-19 and expanding its limited maintenance facilities. At present, major overhauls are done by the Chinese.

Peking pledged continued support and signed its seventh major arms agreement with Islamabad in late 1973. Chinese assent to the new accord was probably hastened by new Soviet arms agreements with India and Pakistan's border tensions with Afghanistan. The accord provides grant aid for all three services. Ground-forces equipment will probably include additional T-59 medium tanks, ammunition, and possibly artillery. The naval equipment may include submarines and additional Shanghai-II class motor gunboats. The air force will probably receive additional fighter aircraft.

France: Since the end of 1965, Paris has provided over $300 million in military equipment (Table 5). Most of the French equipment is sophisticated and expensive and is financed under seven- to ten-year credits. Deliveries have included 26 Mirage III jet fighters, 28 Mirage 5s, 3 Daphne-class submarines, and about 30 Alouette III helicopters.

In April 1972, Islamabad presented Paris with an extensive military shopping list reportedly valued at more than $150 million. The request included 18 additional Mirage III jet fighters, 4 Breguet Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, a Daphne-class submarine, air-to-surface missiles, the Exocet anti-ship missile, electronic and radar equipment, and a small quantity of ground-force weapons. Negotiations are still under way, and the request has been expanded to include the assembly and eventual manufacture of Mirage aircraft in Pakistan. Contracts known to have been concluded cover delivery of one Puma and six Alouette helicopters, a $3-million Mirage flight-simulator unit, and a small quantity of Exocet missiles. Islamabad has since expressed interest in acquiring both the Roland and Crotale surface-to-air missile systems.

Other Sources: Pakistan has received some $150 million worth of military equipment from a variety of secondary sources. About 80 percent of this materiel was delivered after 1965. West German, Canadian, Iranian, Turkish,

and Spanish suppliers provided Pakistan with badly needed spare parts for aging US equipment. Islamabad was not able to procure the parts directly because of US restrictions. In addition, these countries acted as a channel for US equipment sold as surplus by NATO countries and for weapons produced in Europe under US license. West European suppliers also provided Pakistan with licenses to manufacture such items as G-3 rifles and Cobra wire-guided missiles. Pakistan is presently negotiating with Canada for an air-defense radar system for its border with India.

In July 1972, Pakistan concluded a $25-million military agreement with North Korea for sixty 130-mm. field guns, one hundred 14.5-mm. anti-aircraft machine guns, ammunition, and ancillary equipment. Delivery was scheduled to be completed in 1974, with payment in hard currency and on commercial terms. Contracts for an additional $16 million of ground-force weapons may also have been concluded.

C. Bangladesh

Soviet Involvement: When the state of Bangladesh was formed in late 1971, it inherited some of the military equipment left behind by Pakistan. This included an assortment of infantry weapons, some artillery, armored vehicles, eight F-86 jet fighters, and a few utility aircraft.

The USSR was quick to offer assistance in establishing an air force. In March 1972 an agreement was signed for 18 MIG-21 jet fighters, 12 MI-8 helicopters, and 3 AN-24/AN-26 transport aircraft. By the end of 1973, all of the aircraft except for some MI-8s had been delivered. The agreement also included training in the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. About 300 Bengalis have gone to the USSR for training, and some 200 Soviet technical and advisory personnel are in Bangladesh.

Indian Support: India, Bangladesh's primary source of ground forces and naval equipment, has provided an estimated $17.7 million worth of equipment. Prior to independence, Bengalee rebels received small arms, mortars, recoilless rifles, and vehicles from India. In early 1973, India provided its first naval equipment—a small patrol craft. In early 1974, New Delhi extended about $20 million in credits for the purchase of ammunition and quartermaster supplies. India also assumed the major role in training Bangladesh army and navy personnel.

Other Sources: Bangladesh submitted a detailed list of defense requirements to a visiting Yugoslav delegation in November 1973. In addition to a wide

variety of ground-force weaponry, the list contained a request for naval craft, jet trainers, and reconnaissance aircraft. Thus far, Belgrade has only agreed to grant about $3.5 million worth of equipment, including patrol boats, small arms, and a limited number of light artillery pieces.

The UK in early 1973 provided the air force with two Wessex helicopters along with technical assistance in their use. A British firm is supplying military vehicles, and Dacca has requested additional officer training in the UK. Some small arms and mortars may also have been obtained from Israel during 1971, with New Delhi acting as intermediary.

D. Afghanistan

Soviet Dominance: Afghanistan was the first non-Communist military aid client of the USSR, and it has relied exclusively on Communist sources for its weaponry over the past 18 years. In this period Kabul received over $400 million worth of military assistance, almost 95 percent of it from the USSR. Czechoslovakia provided most of the balance—$23 million for the procurement of weapons, trainer aircraft, and a small-arms and ammunition plant and military repair facility. Minimal amounts of military technical assistance and training have been provided by the US, UK, France, Turkey, India, and Poland.

In the mid-1950s Afghanistan, alarmed by the large quantities of arms Pakistan was receiving as a member of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, enlisted Soviet aid in expanding and modernizing its armed forces. The two nations signed a $100-million accord in 1956 providing for delivery of aircraft and ground forces equipment.

Since that time the USSR has furnished 35 IL-28 jet light bombers, 25 SU-7 fighter-bombers, 44 MIG-21 jet fighters, 275 other aircraft, and the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system. Land armaments delivered include more than 1,600 field and antiaircraft artillery pieces, about 600 medium tanks, about 50 assault guns, and 395 armored personnel carriers. Most of this equipment was provided at a 75-percent discount, with repayment of the balance over 15 years at 2-percent interest, making Kabul the most favored of Moscow's major military aid clients.

The Soviet arms aid program to Afghanistan gained impetus in 1971 with the provision of new military extensions valued at more than $107 million. Under an agreement signed in January of that year, Kabul was to receive $40 million in ground-force weaponry, including more than 100

medium tanks and an undetermined number of PT-76 light tanks, 60 armored personnel carriers, some of them equipped with Sagger antitank missiles, 76-mm. and 100-mm. guns, and crew-served weapons and small arms for one division. While this agreement was under negotiation, the Afghan minister of national defense requested that the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system previously provided be modified and updated. Soviet technicians were sent in April to carry out the necessary modifications, which cost about $100,000.

Kabul concluded another agreement with Moscow in July 1971 for about $67 million worth of equipment, including an unspecified number of MI-8 helicopters to be armed with both rockets and machine guns, and 152 tank transporters.

Soviet military deliveries to Afghanistan accelerated after the coup against the monarchy in July 1973. Military shipments totaled $46 million in 1973, almost three times the annual average for the previous two years. The new equipment included T-62 medium tanks, ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, BMP infantry combat vehicles, and the Sagger anti-tank missile system, along with additional T-54/55 medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, MI-8 helicopters, trucks, and support equipment. About 95 Soviet tanks were delivered in 1973, and at least 33 more have arrived in 1974.

Prospects: Moscow will continue to be the predominant source for Afghanistan's defense procurement. The availability of large amounts of Soviet military equipment on exceptionally favorable terms would in itself be sufficient for Kabul to continue the relationship. Meanwhile, its dominance of the Afghan arms market ensures Moscow of a friendly neighbor on its southern periphery and one that is unlikely to become enmeshed in an anti-Soviet defense alliance. Kabul also will remain dependent on the hundreds of Soviet military advisers and technicians who instruct Afghan personnel in the operation and maintenance of equipment.

E. Nepal

Nepal depends on India and Western sources for the bulk of its military materiel. Some small-arms ammunition is produced in Nepal with machinery and technology supplied by West Germany. Almost all infantry weapons have come from India and the UK. Nepal is currently re-equipping its military with Indian rapid-firing small arms. The US has provided trucks and support equipment under the Military Assistance Program. Nepal's only serviceable aircraft are two British Skyvan transports and one French Alouette III helicopter.

Military aid from the USSR and China has been minimal, consisting of a few aircraft no longer in operational service, vehicles, ammunition, radios, and spare parts.

F. Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is dependent on foreign sources for all its arms and equipment except for a few quartermaster items. The UK has been the principal source of materiel, having provided the bulk of equipment for all three Sri Lanka services. Deliveries totaled over $13 million and include 55 armored and scout cars; 35 helicopters, trainers, and transport aircraft; and 35 naval craft, mostly small patrol boats. The UK also provided most of the training for the Sri Lanka armed forces, although Colombo now conducts much of its own training.

In order to meet immediate arms requirements to combat insurgency, Sri Lanka in 1971 accepted its first Communist military aid. The PRC provided $6 million in grant aid covering five Shanghai-II class motor gunboats, twelve 85-mm. field guns, and small arms. The USSR, under $2 million of contracts with liberal repayment terms, delivered five MIG-17 jet fighters, one MIG-15 jet trainer, two KA-26 helicopters, ten BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, spare parts and ammunition. All Communist deliveries were completed by the end of 1972, and Colombo is once again relying on its traditional Western suppliers.

Table 1

INDIA: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS
(*Million US $*)

	1954–73	1954–65	1966–73	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Total	2,464	848	1,638	295	129	189	183	159	272	219	196
Free World Countries	960	574	364	35	43	46	48	62	42	56	36
Belgium	9	1	8	....	....	3	4	....	Negl.	1	Negl.
France	110	68	42	5	5	5	2	3	3	3	16
West Germany	20	9	11	1	1	2	....	7	....	....	....
United Kingdom	514	255	259	14	29	29	36	48	35	48	20
United States	177	142	35	10	8	4	4	3	3	3	Negl.
Other [1]	108	99	9	1	....	3	2	1	1	1	Negl.
Communist Countries	1,548	274	1,274	260	86	143	135	97	230	163	160
USSR	1,397	266	1,131	213	86	134	127	81	180	156	154
Eastern Europe	129	....	129	43	....	....	8	16	50	6	6
People's Republic of China	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Yugoslavia	22	8	14	4	....	9	....	....	....	1	Negl.

[1] *Includes Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.*

Table 2

INDIA: SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLY AGREEMENTS
(Million US $)

Date	Value	Selected Types of Equipment Ordered	Status [1]
Total.....	1,405		
Nov 1960.....	21	Eight AN-12 heavy transports.....	(C)
Mar 1961.....	6	24 IL-14 medium transports.....	(C)
May 1961.....	2	Eight MI-4 helicopters.....	(C)
Jan 1962.....	2	11 MI-4 helicopters.....	(C)
Aug 1962.....	46	18 AN-12 heavy transports.....	(C)
Aug 1962.....	170	Plant facilities and license for production of 196 MIG-21FL jet fighters; subsequent contracts were for importation of raw material and components for production. (This figure represents the total projected foreign exchange cost of the program.)	(U)
Aug 1962.....	12	12 MIG-21 jet fighters.....	(C)
Jan 1963.....	6	22 MI-4 helicopters.....	(C)
Apr 1963.....	16	Six AN-12 heavy transports.....	(C)
Aug 1963.....	38	Eight SA-2 missile firing battalions.....	(C)
Apr 1964.....	40	Nine SA-2 missile firing battalions.....	(C)
Sep 1964.....	197	38 MIG-21 jet fighters, six U-MIG-21 jet trainers, 389 130-mm field guns, 52 T-55 medium tanks, 176 light tanks, and nine AN-12 heavy transports.	(C)
Sep 1965.....	106	Four F-class submarines, five Petya-class escorts, five patrol boats, two landing craft, and one Ugra-class submarine tender.	(C)
Jan 1966.....	11	Three TU-124 passenger aircraft, 40 MI-4 helicopters.....	(C)
Oct 1966.....	153	139 SU-7 jet fighter-bombers and jet trainers.....	(C)
Jan 1968.....	33	Naval dockyard project at Vishakhapatnam.....	(U)
Aug 1968.....	42	25 MIG-21s, 75 medium tanks, and ammunition.....	(C)
Feb 1969.....	62	Eight Osa-class missile patrol boats, one submarine rescue ship, other naval equipment, and $17 million worth of spare parts.	(C)
Jun 1969.....	10	SA-2 equipment.....	(C)
Oct 1969.....	120	Licensed production of 150–170 MIG-21M jet fighters.....	(U)
2nd half 1969.....	10	Vehicles.....	(C)
1st half 1970.....	56	27 MIG-21s, 15 SU-7s.....	(U)
1st half 1970.....	28	Spare parts.....	(C)
June 1971.....	50	Ground forces equipment.....	(C)
Dec 1971.....	127	Five Petya-class patrol boats, four F-class submarines.....	(U)
2nd half 1971.....	18	MI-8 helicopters.....	(C)
Mar 1972.....	45	Eight Osa-class large guided-missile craft.....	(U)
Mar 1972.....	4	Radar.....	(C)
1st half 1972.....	27	Ground-forces equipment.....	(U)
Jul 1972.....	65	Replacements for aircraft lost in December 1971 war.....	(U)
Aug 1972.....	8	MI-8 helicopters.....	(C)
1st half 1973.....	NA	MI-8 helicopters.....	(U)
2nd half 1973.....	140	SA-6 missiles, ground-forces equipment.....	(U)

[1] *(C) completed; (U) in process of delivery.*

Table 3

PAKISTAN: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS
(*Million US $*)

	1954–73	1954–65	1966–73	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Total	1,757	960	797	153	43	89	110	90	53	108	151
Free World Countries	1,388	950	438	88	16	56	69	68	17	35	89
Belgium	17	....	17	16	....	1	Negl.	....	....	Negl.	....
Canada	8	Negl.	8	8	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
France	280	39	241	2	2	40	49	43	4	26	75
West Germany	41	8	33	21	1	4	1	1	1	1	3
Iran	8	....	8	....	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Italy	21	....	21	13	7	....	....	....	....	1	....
Turkey	33	17	16	16	....	....	....	....	....	....	Negl.
United Kingdom	172	162	10	8	....	....	....	....	Negl.	....	2
United States	790	717	73	4	4	8	16	21	10	4	6
Other [1]	18	7	11	....	....	2	2	2	1	2	2
Communist Countries	369	10	359	65	27	33	41	22	36	73	62
People's Republic of China	305	10	295	65	24	21	20	20	36	64	45
Czechoslovakia	24	....	24	....	....	8	7	1	....	....	8
USSR	24	....	24	....	3	4	14	1	....	1	1
North Korea	16	....	16	....	....	....	....	....	....	8	8

[1] *Includes Austria, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.*

Table 4

PAKISTAN: MILITARY SUPPLY AGREEMENTS WITH CHINA
(*Million US $*)

Date	Value	Selected Types of Equipment Ordered	Status [1]
Total	366		
Sep 1965	75	74 MIG-19 jet fighters, 4 IL-28 jet bombers, 192 medium tanks, and artillery	(C)
Jul 1966	42	110 medium tanks, and artillery	(C)
May 1967	50	60 MIG-19s, 252 medium tanks, and artillery	(C)
Dec 1967	3	Aircraft engines	(C)
Nov 1970	40	Ground-forces equipment for two army divisions	(C)
Nov 1971	60	Ground-forces equipment for two army divisions, 30 MIG-19s, 8 Shanghai IIs, other naval equipment.	(U)
Feb 1972	65	Ground-forces equipment for two army divisions, naval craft	(U)
Nov 1973	10	10 MIG-19s, naval and ground-forces equipment	(U)
Apr 1974	1	Tank engines, spares	(C)
1st half 1974	20	50 MIG-19s, FT-5 trainer aircraft, naval and ground-forces equipment	(U)

[1] *(C) Completed: (U) In process of delivery.*

Table 5

PAKISTAN: MILITARY SUPPLY AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE
(Million US $)

Date	Value	Selected Types of Equipment Ordered	Status [1]
Total	324		
Oct 1966	38	3 Daphne-class submarines	(C)
Dec 1965	84	24 Mirage III jet fighters	(C)
Feb 1967	2	7 Alouette III helicopters	(C)
Jan 1968	5	Matra 530 air-to-air missiles	(C)
Feb 1968	Negl.	1 Alouette III helicopter	(C)
Dec 1968	1	Aircraft engines	(C)
Feb 1969	2	Aircraft rockets	(C)
May 1969	2	Naval spares	(C)
Feb 1970	1	1 Mystere transport	(C)
Jun 1970	96	28 Mirage 5 and 2 Mirage III jet fighters, Matra 530 air-to-air missiles, aircraft rockets and ammunition.	(C)
Jun 1970	3	10 Alouette III helicopters; license to assemble Alouette IIIs	(U)
Jun 1972	12	Mirage flight simulator, 6 Alouette III helicopters, ammunition	(C)
Sep 1972	1	1 Puma helicopter	(C)
Oct, Dec 1972	2	Ammunition, support equipment	(C)
Jan 1973	5	50 Matra 550 air-to-air missiles	(U)
Apr 1973	Negl.	Ammunition	(U)
Sep 1973	6	9 Alouette III helicopters	(U)
May 1974	24	3 Brequet-Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft	(U)
May 1974	40	Crotale surface-to-air missile system	(U)

[1] *(C) Completed; (U) In process of delivery.*

Table 6

BANGLADESH: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS, 1971–1973
(Million US $)

Total	48.8
Free World Countries	19.8
India	17.7
United Kingdom	2.1
Communist Countries	29.0
USSR	29.0

Table 7

AFGHANISTAN: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS, 1956–1973
(Million US $)

	1956–73	1956–65	1966–73	1971	1972	1973
USSR	378	140	238	15	17	46
Czechoslovakia	23	23	....	....	....	....
United States [1]	4.6	2.9	1.6	0.2	0.2	0.2

[1] *Training under MAP.*

Table 8

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLY AGREEMENTS
(Million US $)

Date	Value	Selected Types of Equipment Ordered	Status
Total	462		
1st half 1956	100	Aircraft, T-34 tanks, small arms	(C)
Aug 1959	23	Artillery, T-54/55 tanks	(C)
2nd half 1960	40	SA-2 surface-to-air missile system	(C)
1st half 1961	1	Spare parts	(C)
Feb 1964	16	Aircraft spare parts	(C)
Oct 1964	80	MIG-21 jet fighters, medium tanks, antiaircraft artillery	(C)
Nov 1966	44	T-54/55 tanks, artillery, support equipment, small arms, ammunition	(C)
Nov 1966	44	SU-7 jet fighter bombers, MIG-21 jet fighters, MI-8 helicopters	(C)
Jan 1971	40	Tanks, APCs, artillery, small arms	(U)
Mar 1971	Negl.	SA-2 missile modifications	(C)
Jul 1971	67	MI-8 helicopters, tank transporters	(U)
2nd half 1973	7	MIG-17 jet fighters, replacement aircraft	(C)

Table 9

NEPAL: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS, 1954–1973
(*Million US $*)

Total	9.5
Free World Countries	8.0
France	0.3
Germany	1.7
India	0.7
Israel	0.1
Japan	0.3
United Kingdom	3.0
United States	1.9
Communist Countries	1.5
PRC	0.6
USSR	0.9

Table 10

SRI LANKA: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS, 1954–1973
(*Million US $*)

Total	37.6
Free World Countries	29.1
Australia	0.1
Canada	0.2
India	0.2
Israel	11.6
Italy	.0.1
United Kingdom	13.4
United States	3.5
Communist Countr es	8.5
PRC	6.0
USSR	2.0
Yugoslavia	0.5

ANNEX A

South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capabilities

1. India

India became the world's sixth nuclear power on May 18, 1974, when it detonated a 10-15 kiloton device in an underground test. The nuclear materials for the blast came from the Canadian-built CIRUS reactor at the Bhaba Atomic Research Center near Bombay. India had promised the Canadians in writing that the reactor and its products would be used only for peaceful purposes. The Indians, however, have never accepted the Canadian and US interpretation that any nuclear explosion is tantamount to a weapons test. India has ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty but not the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The step from exploding a nuclear device to producing a primitive bomb deliverable by aircraft is not great, and India almost certainly has the technology to build such a weapon. Domestic pressure on the government to develop a military weapon almost certainly will be intense, but the cost of creating an effective medium-range delivery system and the loss of credibility to a government which has consistently denied that it would develop a nuclear weapons system would also be great.

The CIRUS reactor in Bombay has been in operation for over a decade, and the Indians probably have enough plutonium to make 15 or 20 nuclear devices or weapons, each with an approximate yield of 15 kilotons. Production of plutonium would allow them to make about two more devices each year.

A large Indian-built nuclear power plant at Kalpakkam, in south India, is scheduled to be in operation sometime after 1977. With current and planned separation facilities, the plant, which will have two reactors fueled by natural uranium. could produce enough plutonium to make from 50 to 70 low-yield bombs a year in the 1980s. A prototype for a new generation of fast-breeder reactors producing U-233 from India's huge supplies of thorium may be ready in the 1980s.

Current Indian delivery capabilities, like the prospective weapons themselves, are modest. A fleet of about 40 Canberra light bombers, with a radius of about 1,000 nautical miles and a payload of 5,000 pounds, could reach India's closer neighbors, including much of western and southwestern China,

but not the heavily populated Chinese cities farther east. India has no long-range bombers but could, with extensive modifications, use some of its civil fleet of Boeing 707s and 747s to carry weapons several thousand miles. All of these aircraft would be vulnerable to Chinese air defenses.

India's planned and slowly expanding capabilities in the nuclear and space-related fields will eventually remove many of the obstacles to a large-scale nuclear weapons program. In the late 1980s there will be enough plutonium and U-233 to make a number of intermediate-yield weapons. The Indian space program, which is still in its early stages, probably will have borne fruit by then. To date, only sounding rockets have been tested.

A small test satellite was scheduled for launch in 1974, but the Indians have been unable to develop a suitable launch vehicle. As a result, the Soviets have agreed to orbit a satellite constructed in India. An Indian satellite launch is still at least five years away, and even then quite a few additional years and considerable cost would be required to develop an operational missile system.

2. Pakistan

India's nuclear test will spur a Pakistani effort to develop nuclear weapons, but Islamabad is unlikely to have any effective nuclear capability within the current decade.

The Pakistanis are just beginning their nuclear power program, and are greatly dependent on foreign technological and financial assistance. They presently have a 125-megawatt reactor acquired from Canada that began operating in December 1972. The reactor is under IAEA safeguards, which call for periodic inspections by UN teams.

Pakistan is constructing, with Canadian assistance, a fuel element fabrication facility at Nilore that will be completed in 1975. Islamabad is also seeking to construct, with foreign assistance, a chemical separation plant that would take about four years to complete. These facilities, when constructed and operational, would enable Pakistan to manufacture plutonium and, after irradiation, extract it from the fuel elements of a reactor.

If Pakistan decides to undertake a nuclear weapons program, the plutonium yielded by its present reactor will be sufficient to produce from 10 to 20 nuclear weapons a year, if safeguards are disregarded. Studies of high-explosive development and nuclear device design, however, could not be completed before the end of this decade without considerable foreign assistance.